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The Effect of Supply Chain Configuration on Small Modular 
Reactor Economics 
Robbie Eric Lyons  
This thesis examines the opportunity presented by small modular reactors (SMRs) to 
bring down the cost of nuclear power. The economies of scale that have traditionally driven 
nuclear vendors to design larger reactors can be overcome for small reactors by the 
combination of standardisation of design, modularisation of the build process, and progressive 
reduction in production cost through learning.  
By employing the most comprehensive nuclear plant construction cost data available, 
in conjunction with established cost estimating methods, a model was devised to estimate the 
capital costs and levelized electricity cost of a SMR, based on conventional light water reactor 
technology. Key elements of supply chain configuration were parameterised in the model, 
enabling the investigation of its effect on SMR economics. Credible SMR supply chain 
configurations were hypothesised, by applying procurement decision models to industry data 
and nuclear sector specific constraints. These configurations were evaluated using the model 
against a range of programme conditions. Beyond single programme supply chain design, the 
challenges posed by global production and deployment were considered, such as the 
segmentation of market demand, variations in labour costs, and the implications of regulatory 
barriers and localisation for SMR cost reduction methods. The costs of first developing a SMR 
programme were also estimated.  
It was established that in order for SMRs to become cost competitive with large nuclear 
plants, a sizeable programme of at least 10 GW of standard units is needed to achieve sufficient 
production volume and production rate. The preferred SMR size is in the region of 250 MWe, 
to achieve a balance between economies of scale and learning.  Progress needs to be made in 
harmonising global technical standards and safety regulation to make the product-like reactor 
concept feasible. Moreover, a committed supply chain of collaborative enterprise partners, 
rather than competing transactional suppliers, is required to realise the necessary learning cost 
reduction.  
  
Preface 
This thesis is the culmination of a research project conducted by the author, and builds 
upon previous works produced by the author. The introduction in Section 1 is an updated 
version of that from the First Year Report produced for this project (Lyons, 2016), in which 
the background and motivation for the research was first articulated. Furthermore, significant 
elements of the cost model described in this thesis were first presented at the International 
Congress on Advances in Nuclear Power Plants 2018, and as such the explanation of these 
elements in Section 2 is adapted from the associated conference proceedings (Lyons & 
Roulstone, 2018). 
The research itself was conducted with the camaraderie of Clara Lloyd, and generous 
support from Tony Roulstone. The treatment of indirect cost accounts described in Section 
2.4.6 specifically was developed in collaboration with Lloyd, and is similarly presented in her 
thesis (Lloyd, 2019). 
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1. Introduction 
This introduction is an updated version of that from the First Year Report associated 
with this research project (Lyons, 2016). 
 Background 
Nuclear power continues to be an appealing source of electricity generation, 
particularly for baseload provision, because of its stable operating costs and low carbon 
emissions. These characteristics contrast starkly with those of gas-fired power stations: their 
operation is sensitive to the fluctuating fuel price, and while cleaner than coal, burning natural 
gas still emits a significant amount of carbon dioxide (Energy Information Administration, 
2016). While this would seem to give nuclear power plants a significant advantage over fossil 
fuels, they are currently held back by the fact that nuclear power is an expensive technology.  
Based on cost data from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy 
(2016), a nuclear plant costs over eight times more on a £/kW basis to construct than a 
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy, 2016, pp. 66-70). Figure 1 shows the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) for 
different electricity generating technologies, as determined by BEIS (2016).  
 16 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Graph of LCOE for different technologies (Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, 2016, p. 26) 
Even with the fuel cost estimate of £40/MWh and a future carbon price of £29/MWh, 
a CCGT plant provides cheaper electricity than a First of a Kind (FOAK) nuclear power station 
(Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016, p. 27). In countries such as the 
UK where the electricity generation market has been liberalised, this commercial challenge 
hinders the growth of the technology. 
To understand why nuclear electricity is so expensive, it is useful to breakdown the 
LCOE figure into the contributions made by the various lifecycle costs. Figure 2 is based on 
the same data from BEIS (2016) as Figure 1; it shows that the majority of the levelised cost 
comes from the capital costs associated with construction of the plant. Consequently, to lower 
the cost of nuclear power, these large build costs must be addressed. 
[Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.] 
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Figure 2: Levelised cost components for a conventional nuclear plant (Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016, p. 27) 
1.1.1. Construction of Large Nuclear Reactors 
Since the start of commercial nuclear power in the 1950s, nuclear reactor units have 
grown by two orders of magnitude from the 60MW Magnox reactor of Calder Hall to the 
1750MW EPR currently operating in China (World Nuclear Association, 2019). This can be 
attributed to the pursuit of ‘economies of scale’, whereby the specific costs of construction go 
down as the size of the reactor goes up. This cost behaviour is due to the spreading of fixed 
costs over a larger size, as well as greater operational efficiency (Carelli, et al., 2010, p. 407), 
and has been observed through numerous studies, as summarised by Bowers et al. (1983). 
However, historical construction data shows that an increase in scale of reactor units did not 
necessarily bring down costs. For example, data from the French nuclear programme (between 
1978 and 2002) shows average specific construction costs were higher for 1450 MW reactors 
than for 900 MW (Cour des comptes, 2012, pp. 22-23). To explain similar observations from 
their analysis of US plant construction data, Cantor and Hewlett (1988) suggest that the cost 
benefits of increased size are outweighed by the longer construction periods for larger plants, 
due to the fact that ‘the construction of a large plant is more difficult to manage, productivity 
is lower, or regulatory scrutiny is stricter’ (Cantor & Hewlett, 1988, p. 331). This is 
7%
69%
11%
5%
5%
2%
Nuclear Power Plant LCOE Breakdown
Pre-development costs
Capital costs
Fixed O&M
Variable O&M
Fuel costs
Decommissioning and
Waste Fund
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corroborated by the analysis done by Ganda et al. (2016), which highlighted that the rises in 
US construction cost in the 1970s and 1980s were ‘almost entirely driven by labor cost 
increases’ (Ganda, et al., 2016, p. 968). This was attributed to ‘decreased productivity which, 
in turn, was found to be affected predominately by (1) rework and (2) delays’ (Ganda, et al., 
2016, p. 968).   
Such construction cost increases have not been realised in all nuclear programmes, as 
Lovering et al. (2016) showed in their study of historical construction costs. South Korea is 
highlighted as the one case where construction cost reductions of 1-2% per year have been 
achieved during a nuclear plant build programme (Lovering, et al., 2016, p. 378). The authors 
attribute the global variations in construction costs to differences in ‘factors such as utility 
structure, reactor size, regulatory regime, and international collaboration’ (Lovering, et al., 
2016, p. 380). In the case of South Korea, their cost reduction can be credited to the use of 
standardised reactor design, a single consistent supply chain, and the implementation of 
modular construction as used in the Japanese nuclear programme (Roulstone, 2015a, pp. 5-6).  
1.1.2. Small Modular Reactors 
Todreas (2015) provides a clear definition of a small modular reactor (SMR): it is 
‘small’ due to its output power falling in the range of 10-300 MWe, and it is modular because 
the reactor unit is constructed through the assembly of modules (Todreas, 2015, p. 3). These 
modules would be manufactured in a factory environment, thereby significantly reducing the 
amount of construction activity conducted on-site. As Todreas points out, neither of these two 
characteristics are novel. As already mentioned, the first commercial nuclear power plants were 
small, and modular construction techniques have already been applied to modern large reactors, 
such as the Hitachi ABWR (McDonald, 2013) and Westinghouse AP1000 (Bowser, 2010). 
However, the combination of these two attributes is intended to not only provide a more 
competitive form of nuclear power (i.e. with a lower LCOE), but also an alternative commercial 
proposition that could be more appealing to investors. 
As already discussed, the largest component of a nuclear plant’s LCOE is the levelised 
capital costs. In order for this to be significantly reduced, an SMR will need to have a lower 
specific capital cost than a conventional large reactor. As laid out by the NEA (2011), while 
economies of scale may not have been realised as a benefit for large reactors, they would be 
expected to result in significantly higher specific capital costs for an SMR. However, the SMR 
concept targets several different methods of cost reduction which would outweigh the scale 
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effect. These are explored in detail by the Nuclear Energy Agency (2011, pp. 65-88), and can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Factory manufacture: the conditions of a factory environment improve 
productivity to give a one-off cost benefit, as well as facilitating learning-by-
doing which lowers capital costs as the programme progresses; 
2. Shorter construction duration: also enabled by the factory manufacture and 
site assembly approach, this reduces both the total standing costs of operating a 
construction site and the financing costs; 
3. Design simplification: the smaller size of SMRs allows for the consolidation 
of the complex systems required by large reactors (Nuclear Energy Agency, 
2011, p. 88). 
 
Beyond the more competitive LCOE, the SMR concept differentiates itself from 
conventional large plants in two ways, as the NEA (2011) explains. Firstly, the small power 
output of an individual SMR unit makes it appropriate for deployment where electricity 
demand is not sufficient to necessitate a large reactor. Secondly, in a scenario where a large 
plant is needed, it would be possible to build the plant up in stages. An individual unit could 
go into operation before the others are built, or perhaps even ordered. This would not only 
reduce the initial capital investment required, but also allow the output of the plant to be scaled 
up when demand increases. These two differentiating factors mean that SMRs offer an 
alternative commercial proposition for investors, which could be more appealing than a 
conventional large plant (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2011, p. 12).  
 SMR Economics: Current Status of the Field of Research 
An underlying problem with SMR economic arguments as they stand today is that an 
SMR has not yet been built, and therefore there is no real cost data available. Consequently, 
work has been done to try to estimate the costs of SMR construction, using a variety of different 
methods. Carelli et al. (2010) sought to determine the relationship between SMR and large 
reactor capital and operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The authors built on the 
established knowledge of capital cost scaling, and developed cost reduction factors to account 
for the benefits of learning-by-doing, co-siting of multiple units, modularisation, and the 
potential financing options open to SMRs. This led to the determination that an SMR’s total 
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capital cost would be broadly similar to that of a large reactor, given the SMR-to-large reactor 
capital cost factor ratio of 1.05. A similar methodology for O&M costs predicted that SMRs 
would be greater than 20% more costly during operation (Carelli, et al., 2010, p. 412). The 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) conducted a similar top-down analysis of SMR costs, and 
concluded that they could not compete with large reactors on a LCOE basis (Nuclear Energy 
Agency, 2011, p. 26).  
Abdulla et al. (2013) applied a different method to estimate SMR costs: expert 
assessment. The authors ‘developed detailed technical descriptions of two SMR designs and 
then conduced [sic] elicitation interviews’ (Abdulla, et al., 2013, p. 9686). Unsurprisingly, the 
authors received varied estimates for SMR construction costs, although the group of experts 
could be divided into those who thought SMRs would be marginally more expensive than large 
reactors, and those that thought they would be much more expensive (Abdulla, et al., 2013, p. 
9689). This would suggest that those in the latter group were not convinced that the cost scaling 
effect could be overcome in the ways described in Section 1.1.2. On the other hand the experts 
largely agreed that SMRs could be built quicker than large reactors, ‘because of the increased 
use of modular construction, the integration of all nuclear components into a single factory-
built module, and the reduced complexity of the balance of plant’ (Abdulla, et al., 2013, p. 
9688).  
Along with efforts to determine costs, studies have been done that explore potential 
build strategies for SMRs. Maronati et al. (2016) investigated the effect of the modular 
construction strategy on the total capital cost, by employing cash flow analysis and assumptions 
about productivity with regards to on-site verses off-site work. (Maronati, et al., 2016, p. 1). 
The results highlighted the cost reduction effect of modular construction, and in particular the 
benefits of employing factory manufacturing. These two methods applied together resulted in 
a total capital cost reduction of 39% compared to traditional ‘stick construction’ strategy 
(Maronati, et al., 2016, p. 4). 
In their comprehensive review of the SMR proposition, Goldberg and Rosner (2011) 
modelled the effect of learning on SMR costs, with particular focus on the competition with 
gas-fired power plants. By assuming a level of learning cost reduction based on previous work 
(The University of Chicago, 2004), the authors modelled an SMR production programme 
which brought the LCOE down in line with natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) generation. 
Their results are summarised in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: LCOE of SMR plants (Rosner & Goldberg, 2011, p. 21) 
The green band between ‘High End NGCC’ and ‘Low End NGCC’ represents the 
estimated range of the LCOE for an NGCC based on historical variations in the natural gas 
price (Rosner & Goldberg, 2011, p. 16). The upper and lower band curves arise from variations 
in the assumed specific capital cost of the first, or ‘LEAD’ plant, as well as the subsequent 
learning effect. The assumed case depicted by the green curve found that after 18 SMR units 
had been produced, the subsequent units could begin to compete with NGCC, having reached 
an LCOE of $80/MWh. It should also be noted that the study’s model assumed ‘an SMR multi-
module manufacturing facility’ (Rosner & Goldberg, 2011, p. 18), and the authors indicated 
the intention to explore in detail, the potential for learning in such a facility (Rosner & 
Goldberg, 2011, p. 18). 
The report by Chen et al. (2013) details this subsequent study of factory learning. The 
authors modelled the manufacturing of the ‘Integrated Reactor Vessel (IRV)’ (Chen, et al., 
2013) of the same generic SMR design used by Rosner & Goldberg (2011). Using a component 
breakdown of this posited IRV, the authors employed a manufacturing simulation tool which 
estimated the various manufacturing costs for the first IRV (Chen, et al., 2013, pp. 24-27). Most 
notably however, the simulation tool was also able to estimate the aggregate learning cost 
reduction as multiple IRVs were manufactured. This was achieved by estimating the basic 
[Republished with permission of Robert Rosner] 
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manufacturing processes involved in the production of the individual subcomponents, and 
applying learning cost reduction to these specific activities. These levels of cost reduction were 
based either on the simulation tool’s own library, or by the authors’ insertion of learning rates 
based on data from comparable industries (Chen, et al., 2013, pp. 49-50). In this way, the 
authors determined an overall learning rate of 6.7% (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 69) for IRV 
manufacture. The significance of this study is that it derived the overall learning cost reduction, 
rather than simply applying an assumed rate to the total capital costs. Moreover, the authors 
explored how the production arrangements – specifically the ‘lot size’ – influenced this overall 
learning effect (Chen, et al., 2013, p. 61). This represents a significant step in characterising 
the factors that affect learning cost reduction in SMR production, and provides a conceptual 
foundation for the research that is presented in this thesis. 
 Research Objective 
The economic case for SMRs relies on overcoming economies of scale by: 
 
• producing multiple units of a standardised design; 
• a high degree of modularisation, moving labour into a more productive 
environment and shortening build times; 
• the realisation of cost reduction from learning due to the series production of 
these standard units. 
 
 While several studies have sought to estimate the balance of scaling and these cost 
reduction methods, absent from consideration has been the role of the supply chain structure 
that will deliver such a production programme. As for large reactors, a SMR supply chain will 
likely consist of a range of specialist suppliers, providing components for one or multiple 
plants, either directly or via module fabrication. Some components may be procured from 
multiple suppliers. These factors will affect learning in particular, as is discussed in Section 
3.3, but also the extent to which standardisation and modularisation can be achieved. Beyond 
internal supply chain considerations, external market factors will also have an influence. The 
expected global demand for SMRs (Waddington, 2014) will not be a uniform market, nor one 
solely driven by cost considerations. Different countries have different regulatory regimes and 
technical standards, which challenge standardisation. The geopolitical nature of nuclear 
technology means that countries may prefer an expensive domestic programme rather than a 
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cheaper import. Those countries that are open to international programmes may demand 
localisation of manufacturing as justification for their investment. Alternatively, the lack of 
local knowledge and skills may remove local supply as an option for vendors. These factors 
complicate the evaluation of learning cost reduction that can be achieved, and thus how 
economically competitive SMRs might be. 
The objective of the research presented in this thesis was to determine how the supply 
chain configuration will affect the economic competitiveness of SMRs. To achieve this, 
answers were sought to the following questions: 
 
1. What are the relevant factors that characterise a supply chain configuration 
when considering SMR economics? 
2. What are credible supply chain configurations that could be adopted in a SMR 
production programme? 
3. Can any of these configurations deliver cost competitive SMRs, and under what 
conditions? 
 
In Section 2 the cost model developed to evaluate SMR costs is presented. In Section 
3, supply chain theory from literature and practice from industry are examined; this provides 
the conceptual basis for the integration of supply chain configuration into the cost model. In 
Section 4 credible supply chain configurations for SMR production are derived, and then tested 
against a range of single programme conditions. In Section 5 possible global demand for SMRs, 
its geographic distribution and the resultant supply chain and programme constraints are 
considered. In Section 6 estimates are determined for the setup costs for an SMR programme, 
and the effect this will have on the competitiveness of the SMR units produced. In Section 7 
the effect of uncertainties in the cost modelling approach on the calculated SMR costs is 
quantified. In Section 8, the findings from the research are discussed and the key conclusions 
presented.   
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2. Cost Estimation Methodology 
Small modular reactors are intended to be realised at lower capital cost than 
conventional large reactors, principally by the application of three principles: standardisation 
of plant design and construction processes; modularisation, giving a greater degree of factory 
manufacturing and assembly; series production of multiple units. These principles are intended 
to overcome economies of scale that would otherwise make smaller reactors more expensive. 
Standardisation reduces cost by eliminating the repetition of detailed design needed to 
customise each plant. Modularisation raises productivity by changing the work environment, 
thus reducing labour costs; it also shortens the build schedule, which reduces site indirect costs 
and the costs of borrowed capital. Series production lowers costs through learning, which 
results in progressive improvements in labour performance, production processes and tooling.   
In order to evaluate the effects of supply chain configuration on small modular reactor 
economics, a capital cost model was developed that incorporated supply chain parameters. It 
is challenging to predict costs of reactor designs that have not been built yet. The modelling 
approach used in this research is top-down, employing the best available data (as discussed in 
Section 2.3.6) and established cost estimating methods from the literature. A key limitation of 
this approach is that the costs are only representative of the specific technology and design of 
the reference data: in this case, a pressurised water reactor.  
In this chapter, the underlying concepts and implementation of the cost model are 
described. First, the particular costs to be determined by the model are defined and explained, 
followed by a summary of the overall approach to estimating these costs. The reference cost 
data used in the model is then described. The specific cost modelling methods are then 
presented, starting with an explanation of power scaling, followed by the underlying principles 
of the cost reduction methods considered possible for SMRs. An idealised SMR supply chain 
map is then presented which highlights how both costs and the cost reduction methods are 
distributed across the supply chain. The implementation of the cost model is then presented, 
along with a set of sample results and sensitivities. This is followed by a discussion of model 
validation against available data, as well as the limitations of its use.  
 Cost Definitions 
In discussions of SMR economics, as well as for other electricity generating 
technologies, different cost metrics are used, and with varying definitions.  In order to discern 
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the contributions of different effects, three different costs of a single SMR plant are calculated 
by this model: the Overnight Capital Cost (OCC), the Total Capital Cost (TCC), and the 
Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE).  
The OCC is so called because it represents the cost of building a plant ‘overnight’, thus 
not including any financing costs. It is made up of Direct and Indirect costs, the former being 
the sum of labour and material costs that are directly attributable to elements of the plant, while 
the latter is the sum of associated costs of conducting the manufacturing and construction 
activities. The detailed breakdown of these costs is discussed in Section 2.3, as it is particular 
to the reference data set employed by the model. The OCC serves as the most direct measure 
of the impact of manufacturing and construction cost reduction efforts. 
The TCC adds the cost of capital onto the OCC. The cost of capital is a function of the 
cost of equity and debt, as well as the duration of construction, making TCC an important 
measure of the benefits of schedule reduction, as well as perceived risk reduction. Finally, the 
LCOE goes beyond just capital costs by also factoring in the operation and maintenance costs, 
as well as subsequent decommissioning costs. The LCOE effectively stands as the price of the 
electricity generated by the plant that should be set in order to recoup these lifetime costs.  
 Cost Modelling Approach 
Figure 4 gives an overview of the process used to calculate the OCC, TCC, and LCOE 
values for each SMR plant in a continuous programme. The costs are derived from a reference 
cost data set, which is described in detail in Section 2.3; in short, these costs represent the 
average experience of construction costs of an approximately 1 GW PWR plant in the United 
States in 1987. These costs are converted to those for a 250 MW SMR of essentially the same 
design and construction method by applying the top-down estimation method of power scaling. 
Having determined the scaled costs, the cost reduction approaches of standardisation, 
modularisation, and schedule reduction are applied to yield the OCC and TCC of the first unit 
of SMR production. Learning cost reduction is then applied over the course of a posited SMR 
programme to give the capital costs for successive production units. Scaling of reference large 
reactor operation and maintenance costs gives the additional components to determine the 
LCOE for each production SMR unit. 
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Figure 4: Cost modelling approach 
 Reference Capital Cost Data 
The cost data that forms the foundation of the cost model is taken from the Energy 
Economic Data Base (EEDB), curated by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The EEDB 
was established in 1978, and regularly updated through to 1987, for the purpose of providing 
‘current, representative, and consistent power plant technical and cost information…for 
program planning’ (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a, p. ES.1).  
2.3.1. Design Basis 
The data base provides base construction costs (the sum of direct and indirect costs) for 
a number of thermal plant types; of the nuclear power plants included, the PWR-12 reference 
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data is used in this model. The PWR-12 plant design is based upon the Westinghouse 
standardized four loop single unit nuclear steam supply system, as described in the 
Westinghouse Reference Safety Analysis Report, and which corresponds to the Public Service 
Company of New Hampshire Seabrook Station (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988b, 
p. 3.1). However, ‘this design basis has been modified and updated’ with each update to the 
EEDB, ‘in order to reflect current industry practice, experience and response to regulations’ 
(United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988b, p. 3.1). The most recent update, Phase IX, 
brings the design basis, and hence associated costs, up to January 1987. A summary of the key 
design features is given in Table 1.  
 
Number of Reactor Units 1 
Thermal Power (MWt) 3,417 
Net Electrical Power (MWe) 1,144 
Net Plant Efficiency (%) 33.48 
Fuel Type UO2 
Fuel Enrichment (%) 3 
Number of Coolant Loops 4 
Table 1: Key features of EEDB PWR-12 design basis (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 
1988b, pp. 3.2 - 3.4) 
2.3.2. Cost Experiences 
Furthermore, for the PWR-12 design basis the EEDB provides two base construction 
cost estimates: median experience and better experience. The former simply stands as the 
median within the range of cost experiences in US plant construction. The latter was introduced 
in the Phase VI update to the EEDB, ‘because of the increasing spread in the nuclear power 
plant cost range’; it represents better cost experience as the result of ‘regulatory reforms and 
improved construction practices’ (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a, p. ES.5). The 
detailed differences between the median experience (ME) and better experience (BE) data are 
discussed in Section 2.3.5; at this stage it suffices to understand that because the BE data 
already takes credit for some of the cost reduction methods employed in the cost model, the 
ME data was selected as the appropriate reference data. The fact that the ME data represents 
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the average experience also supported the judgement that it was the more appropriate starting 
point for SMR cost estimation.       
2.3.3. Code of Accounts 
The base constructions costs are broken down by a Code of Account system which is 
employed uniformly throughout the EEDB. As previously mentioned, the base construction 
costs are made up direct and indirect costs, which are broken down into 6 and 3 two-digit 
accounts respectively. These accounts are shown in Table 2. 
 
 Account Number Account Name 
 
 
 
Direct Cost 
Accounts 
 
 
21 Structures & Improvements 
22 Reactor Plant Equipment 
23 Turbine Plant Equipment 
24 Electrical Plant Equipment 
25 Miscellaneous Plant Equipment 
26 Main Condenser and Heat Rejection System 
 
Indirect Cost 
Accounts 
 
91 Construction Services 
92 Engineering & Home Office Services 
93 Field Supervision & Field Office Services 
Table 2: EEDB Two Digit Accounts (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a, p. 5.11) 
The EEDB is underpinned by technical data models for ‘over 50 major 
structure/systems and up to 400 subsystems’, with each including ‘system design descriptions, 
engineering drawings, milestone schedules and a detailed equipment list’ (United Engineers & 
Constructors Inc., 1988a, p. ES.4). While these models support accounts down to the nine digit 
level, the Phase IX report only provides the ME data down to the four digit level for direct 
accounts, and three digit level for indirect accounts. In total, data for 154 separate accounts is 
employed by this cost model. 
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2.3.4. Cost Categories 
For each cost account, the total cost is further divided into three cost categories: factory 
equipment, site materials, and site labour. Factory equipment is defined as ‘manufactured or 
factory fabricated items’, while site materials is defined as ‘field purchased or bulk commodity 
items, such as concrete, reinforcing steel, formwork and structural steel’ (United Engineers & 
Constructors Inc., 1988a, p. 7.5). These cost categories are used for both the direct and indirect 
cost accounts; for the latter, these cost categories were judged to be misleading. Therefore, two 
further cost categories were introduced, indirect services and indirect site labour, which are 
used throughout this dissertation. Any factory or site material costs in the indirect accounts 
were re-categorised as indirect services, and site labour costs in these accounts were re-
categorised as indirect site labour. The subsequent distribution of the reference base 
construction costs across these categories is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Cost category distribution (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a)  
2.3.5. ME – BE Data Comparison 
Table 3 compares the ME and BE cost data from the Phase IX report. The data is in 
1987 US Dollars, and shows the absolute and percentage change in costs from the median to 
better estimates.  
 
21%
20%
6%
45%
8%
EEDB Phase IX PWR-12 ME Base Construction Cost 
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Factory
Site Labour
Site Material
Indirect Services
Indirect Site Labour
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 ME BE Change % Change 
Factory $531,024,972 $517,694,361 -$13,330,611 -3% 
Site Labour $505,145,424 $277,159,927 -$227,985,497 -45% 
Site Material $169,296,113 $121,233,944 -$48,062,169 -28% 
Indirect Services $1,131,576,000 $439,780,000 -$691,796,000 -61% 
Indirect Labour $192,293,000 $99,765,000 -$92,528,000 -48% 
Total Base $2,529,335,509 $1,455,633,232 -$1,073,702,277 -42% 
Table 3: ME/BE data comparison (1987 $) (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a) 
The median experience (ME) estimate total cost is ~$2.529bn, while the better 
experience (BE) estimate total cost is ~$1.456bn; this gives a difference of ~$1.074bn. While 
all five cost categories see a reduction between the two estimates, the largest percentage 
changes are in Indirect Services, Indirect Labour and Site Labour. Moreover, as can be seen in 
Figure 6, in absolute terms most of the ~$1.074bn cost reduction comes from Indirect Services. 
 
 
Figure 6: ME-BE cost reduction breakdown 
1%
21%
4%
64%
9%
EEDB Phase 9 ME-BE Base Construction Cost Reduction 
Breakdown ($1.074bn)
Factory Site Labour Site Material Indirect Services Indirect Labour
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Figure 7: Indirect Services reduction breakdown 
Figure 7 shows the breakdown of the Indirect Services cost reduction (~$692m), and 
highlights that it is dominated by savings in ‘Home Office Services’ and ‘Field Job 
Supervision’. The Phase IX report provides the following definitions of these two accounts: 
 
‘Home Office Services: the salaries of personnel, direct payroll-related costs (DPC), 
overhead loading, expenses and related fees associated with the engineering and design (both 
home office and field), procurement and expediting activities, estimating and cost control, 
engineering planning and scheduling, and reproduction services, plus expenses associated with 
performance of the above functions (i.e., telephone, postage, computer use, travel, etc.)’; 
 
‘Field Job Supervision: the salaries, DPC, overhead loading, relocation costs and fees 
associated with the resident construction superintendent and his assistants, craft labor 
supervisors, field accounting, payroll and administrative personnel, field construction 
schedulers, field purchasing personnel, warehouse personnel, survey parties, stenographers and 
clerical personnel.’ (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a, pp. 7.10 - 7.11)   
5%
8%
38%
42%
3%
EEDB Phase 9 ME-BE Indirect Services Reduction 
Breakdown ($692m)
Temporary Construction Facilities Construction Tools & Equip
Payroll Insurance & Taxes Permits, Ins. & Local Taxes
Transportation Home Office Services
Home Office Q/A Home Office Construction Mgmt
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Field QA/QC Plant Startup & Test
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The cost category with the second largest cost reduction from ME to BE is Site Labour 
(~$228m), the breakdown of which is shown in Figure 8. Site Labour is a direct cost, with the 
largest savings being realised for the civil structures and reactor plant equipment. 
  
 
Figure 8: Site Labour cost reduction breakdown 
The Phase IX report explains that these cost reductions between ME and BE can be 
attributed to the partial application of the following: 
 
• ‘the availability of certified (pre-licensed) designs to reduce regulatory 
uncertainty in the areas of licensing, design and construction activities’; 
• ‘a standardized approach to design and construction’;  
• ‘modular construction as a means to reduce site labor and associated field 
supervision, and to improve interfaces among engineering, field supervision and 
site labor’ (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a, p. 3.32). 
34%
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2.3.6. Justification for selected reference data 
The principal reason for the selection of this reference data as the primary input to the 
cost model is the detail it provides. The combination of cost category and code of account 
breakdowns is a critical enabler of the cost reduction estimation, as it illustrates the distribution 
of costs within the supply chain. The code of accounts in particular aids cost comparisons not 
only between plants but also different technologies, and while the code has been adapted by 
different users, such as the EMWG (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007) and the IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 2000), the structure has remained relatively consistent. 
While nuclear construction data is available in the literature, particularly for the large US and 
French programmes as examined by Berthélemy & Rangel (2015), this data is not broken down 
to nearly the same extent as the EEDB.  
It is important to highlight that the costs provided by the EEDB are for January 1987, 
and as discussed in detail by Ganda et al. (2016), one might expect the past trend in real terms 
cost increases above inflation to have continued since then. Ganda et al. (2016, pp. 962-963) 
present an approach to reconcile the EEDB’s historical costs with current ones which includes 
the aforementioned real cost increase. However, the points of comparison are the Better 
Experience costs from the EEDB and costs from two recent US nuclear plant projects, VC 
Summer and Vogtle. The former represent costs of an industry with substantial and recent 
experience, in which the ‘majority of workers have at least some nuclear construction 
experience’ and the ‘local supply chain is capable and has nuclear experience’ (Energy 
Technologies Institute, 2018, p. 10); moreover these costs are the most competitive produced 
under these conditions. Meanwhile, the latter projects implement new reactor designs with an 
industry which has had a multi-decade hiatus in nuclear construction (World Nuclear 
Association, 2019), which are not the conditions likely to produce low costs. 
Consequently, when starting with the more conservative Median Experience costs from 
1987, these were increased to 2017 US dollars simply in line with inflation. This was judged 
to be appropriate for two reasons; firstly, it keeps the cost base credibly tied to the bottom-up 
work done by United Engineers & Constructors to produce the data; secondly, Ganda et al. 
explain that the real term construction cost increases were ‘mostly driven by increased 
regulatory stringency’, and that the period of nuclear construction after 1987 ‘included only 
the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, which had a more muted impact than TMI on the U.S. 
regulatory stringency’ (Ganda, et al., 2016, p. 962).  
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 Cost Modelling Methods 
2.4.1. Power Scaling 
Estimating power plant costs via reactor power scaling is a conventional practice, as 
described by the NEA (2000), Economic Modelling Working Group (2007), and discussed in 
detail by Carelli et al. (2010). As explained by Locatelli et al. (2014), in the context of nuclear 
reactor power scaling, ‘the economies of scale apply if and only if the comparison is 1 Large 
vs. 1 Small and the reactors are of a similar design’ (Locatelli, et al., 2014, p. 76). The cost 
model described in this chapter is consequently limited to evaluating established PWR 
technology, with the cost reductions methods applied following scaling taking account of the 
manufacturing and construction practices uniquely applied to SMRs. Consequently, the scaled 
costs represent the construction cost of an SMR employing the same technology and 
construction processes as the large reactor design associated with the reference data. 
2.4.2. Modularisation 
The approach to adjusting costs to account for the conversion from traditional in-situ 
construction to module manufacturing is based on that from the cost estimating guidelines 
produced by the Economic Modeling Working Group (EMWG) of the Generation IV 
International Forum (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007). In summary, the extent of 
modularisation is defined by modularisation percentages for each cost account, which indicate 
how much of the site labour and material costs are moved off-site. The labour and material 
costs that have thus been assigned to module production are adjusted to reflect productivity 
and labour rate differences between a construction site and factory environment. These ‘shop 
labour’ and ‘shop material’ costs are then used to estimate the additional indirect costs 
associated with module fabrication, transport to site, and installation.  
The modularisation percentages and factors used in this study act as simplifying 
assumptions, as the direct impact of modularisation on SMR costs is not the focus of this work. 
A complementary study by Lloyd (2019) provides a detailed analysis of the potential for and 
effects of modularisation in the context of SMRs. Moreover, the cost modelling methods for 
modularisation and standardisation described in this chapter were developed in collaboration 
with Lloyd and are also employed in the aforementioned study.   
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2.4.3. Schedule Reduction 
A shorter build schedule can reduce nuclear plant construction costs in two principal 
ways. Firstly, it reduces the indirect costs associated with running a construction site, such as 
the costs of renting equipment or facilities. Secondly, it reduces the interest accrued during 
construction on the capital used to fund it. The indirect costs would fall in direct proportion to 
the schedule reduction, while the interest reduction would be greater due to the effect of 
compounding.  
2.4.4. Standardisation 
The establishment of a fixed design and construction process would be expected to 
reduce cost by the avoidance of duplicate work and enabling of learning. However, the work 
to achieve standardisation would also be expected to incur significant up-front cost. This could 
range from computer-based modelling, to experimental testing, or perhaps to a full 
demonstration. The estimation of such up-front costs was ruled out of the scope of the main 
cost model, but is discussed later in Section 6. Consequently, only the cost reductions 
associated with standardisation are implemented in this model. 
2.4.5. Learning 
The concept of production learning was first articulated by Thomas Wright through his 
observations of man-hour reductions in the construction of aircraft (Wright, 1936); specifically, 
Wright determined that the ‘labour input dropped by 20% for every doubling of cumulative 
output’ (Yeh & Rubin, 2012, p. 763). This can be formulated as Equation 1, in which LR stands 
for the learning rate, which characterises the cost reduction, and d stands for the number of 
doublings of production units. 
 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡	𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡	 × (1 − 𝐿𝑅)8	 
Equation 1: Learning cost reduction calculation 
This representation of labour cost reduction has been expanded to cover the total unit 
price of a product, and is referred to as the ‘experience curve’ or ‘progress curve’ (Yeh & 
Rubin, 2012, p. 763). The formulation has also been adapted to determine nth unit costs, rather 
than the average, and is widely used to forecast changes in technology cost (Rubin, et al., 2015, 
p. 199). 
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In order to model the potential cost savings realised from production learning, 
consideration must be given to the different causal factors. These are summarised by Dutton 
and Thomas (1984) as the following:  
• Capital investment – ‘technological change in capital goods’; 
• Direct labour learning – ‘improvement in performance of fixed tasks’; 
• Indirect labour learning – ‘tooling and process changes’; 
• Local system characteristics – such as ‘degree of mechanization, the ratio of 
assembly to machining, the length of cycle times, and whether the process is 
continuous or batch’;  
• Production rate/volume – ‘absorption of fixed costs’, and production 
adaptations (Dutton & Thomas, 1984, pp. 239-240). 
Direct labour learning refers to the cost reduction phenomenon observed by Wright: the 
same people doing the same physical task repeatedly learn to do it more efficiently. Indirect 
labour learning is a step removed from the physical task, by which tools, equipment, and indeed 
the work space itself are reconfigured to take advantage of lessons learnt. Capital investment 
is again a further step removed, factoring in the willingness of an organisation to invest 
resources to deliver the benefits from learning. Local system characteristics in short relates to 
the share of human labour within an activity; automated processes will not exhibit direct labour 
learning, although indirect learning would still be possible. Finally, increases in production rate 
will allow for a greater division of fixed costs and scaling up of production facilities. On the 
other hand, decreases in production rate also create the opportunity for ‘forgetting’ of learning 
(Benkard, 2000). 
When considering that nuclear plants contain significant amounts of large, expensive 
equipment that is made by specialist suppliers, it becomes clear that the supply chain structure 
will have a significant bearing on the learning that is achieved. Specifically, there are two 
important factors: the number of component suppliers, and the relationship they have with the 
plant vendor. For a given component, a single long-term supplier will have access to the full 
volume, providing the greatest opportunity to progress down the experience curve and realise 
learning cost reduction. On the other hand, multiple competing suppliers will not only 
individually produce a smaller volume, but they will do so at a lower production rate, assuming 
that orders are spread evenly between them over the course of a programme. Furthermore, long-
term suppliers with specialist skills and equipment have greater bargaining power in the 
relationship with the reactor vendor than competitive suppliers do; this can result in their 
 37 
 
retention of some of the cost savings realised from their production learning. Depending on the 
strength of these different effects, the supply chain structure will need to strike a balance in 
order to achieve the best aggregate learning results in an SMR programme.  
In this study, the learning cost reduction is modelled using two parameters: production 
rate and supplier type. The implementation of the production rate parameter is explained in 
Section 2.6.6, but the implementation of the supplier type parameter is discussed later in 
Section 3.3, following the discussion of supply chain theory. 
2.4.6. Treatment of indirect cost accounts 
The indirect costs make a significant contribution to total capital costs of nuclear power 
plants. To simplify their treatment, three main groups of indirect costs were identified: 
1. Those related to the operation of the construction site, proportional to the length 
of the build schedule; 
2. Those directly in support of labour activities, proportional to the amount of on-
site labour; 
3. Those related to off-site services. 
Each of the indirect costs was assigned to one of the above groups, and hence to a cost reduction 
method, based on the definitions of the cost accounts provided by United Engineers & 
Constructors Inc. (1988b, pp. 2.11 - 2.13). Those costs that were judged to be associated with 
running a construction site were assigned to schedule reduction. Costs related to labour 
supervision and overheads were assigned to modularisation, as they would reduce in proportion 
to reductions in direct site labour. Home Office Services was the only account assigned to 
Standardisation, as this account was judged to contain the eliminated engineering and design 
costs. All of the specific indirect cost accounts assignments are shown in Table 4. This 
treatment of indirect costs accounts was developed and implemented in collaboration with 
Lloyd (2019).   
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Account Number Account Name Treatment 
91 Construction Services  
911 Temporary Construction Facilities Schedule Reduction 
912 Construction Tools & Equipment Modularisation 
913 Payroll Insurance & Taxes Modularisation 
914 Permits, Insurance & Taxes Schedule Reduction 
915 Transportation n/a 
92 Engineering & Home Office Services  
921 Home Office Services Standardisation 
922 Home Office Quality Assurance Schedule Reduction 
923 Home Office Construction Management Schedule Reduction 
93 Field Supervision & Field Office Services  
931 Field Office Expenses Schedule Reduction 
932 Field Job Supervision Modularisation 
933 Field Quality Assurance/Quality Control Schedule Reduction 
934 Plant Start-up and Test Schedule Reduction 
Table 4: Treatment of indirect cost accounts  
 Supply Chain Map 
The idealised SMR supply chain map that acts as the underlying concept of the cost 
model is shown in Figure 9. It shows the flow of components and material from Suppliers to 
either the module manufacturing facility or directly to the plant site. It also shows the 
distribution of the cost categories and learning effects across the supply chain.  
 39 
 
 
 Model Implementation 
Elements of this cost model were first presented at the International Congress on 
Advances in Nuclear Power Plants 2018. The detailed description of these methods are thus 
adapted from the associated conference proceedings (Lyons & Roulstone, 2018). 
Figure 10 gives an overview of the process used to calculate the OCC, TCC, and LCOE 
for each SMR unit in a given production programme. The blue boxes indicate data values; the 
red boxes indicate cost modelling methods, which are detailed in Sections 2.6.2 – 2.6.6 and 
2.6.8; the yellow boxes indicate general calculation steps, and the green boxes indicate the final 
output costs. The model was implemented in MATLAB, due to the ease of handling large data 
sets via matrix manipulation. The reference data for electricity generation and associated 
operating costs is taken from Lazard (2017); this source was used due to the breakdown of the 
costs provided and ability of the author to reproduce the resultant LCOEs provided in the report. 
 
Module 
Facility 
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Supplier 
Supplier 
Plant Site 
Supplier 
Learning 
Module 
Learning 
Site 
Learning 
Modularisation 
Factory Shop Labour 
Shop Material 
Shop Overhead 
Site Labour 
Site Material 
Indirect Site Labour 
Figure 9: Idealised supply chain map 
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Figure 10: Cost model process overview 
2.6.1. Inflation of reference capital cost data 
To convert the ME data from 1987 US dollars to 2017 US dollars, an inflation factor of 
approximately 2.184 was applied; this was derived from US CPI data (Triami Media BV, 
2017), as was done by Ganda et al. (2016). At this stage, the reference data was also converted 
into specific costs ($/kW), by dividing by the reference reactor power (1,144MWe).  
For direct cost accounts, it was desirable to reproduce the four digit factory costs 
distribution, as this would enable more detailed supply chain modelling. To do this, the four 
digit factory cost distribution present in the PWR12-BE data was overlaid onto the three digit 
ME accounts; this was judged to be appropriate based on the analysis done by Ganda et al. 
(2016), who concluded that ‘equipment costs for the PWR-BE and PWR-ME are very similar’, 
to the extent that ‘virtually no variation was observed for the installed cost of large and 
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expensive equipment such as the Nuclear Steam Supply System and the Turbine Generator’ 
(Ganda, et al., 2016, p. 963). 
2.6.2. Power scaling 
The reference construction costs were scaled to those for a 250 MW SMR using 
Equation 2. 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐	𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡=>?@A8 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐	𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡BACABAD>A 	× 	E 250𝑀𝑊1144𝑀𝑊L(=MN) 
Equation 2: Cost power scaling implementation 
While scaling was applied to four digit account costs in the case of direct costs, the 
scaling factors used were uniform across each two digit account, and are shown in Table 5. 
 
Account Number Account Name Scaling factor, s 
21 Structures & Improvements 0.59 
22 Reactor Plant Equipment 0.53 
23 Turbine Plant Equipment 0.83 
24 Electrical Plant Equipment 0.49 
25 Miscellaneous Plant Equipment 0.59 
26 Main Condenser and Heat Rejection System 1.06 
91 Construction Services 0.69 
92 Engineering & Home Office Services 0.60 
93 Field Supervision & Field Office Services 0.69 
Table 5: Scaling factors (US Department of Energy, 1988, p. 31)  
The Nuclear Energy Cost Data Base provides two sets of scaling factors for nuclear 
power plant cost power scaling: those provided by the CONCEPT code from ORNL (Hudson 
II, 1979), and those derived from the EEDB data itself. The EEDB factors are derived from 
comparison of the BE costs for the PWR12 and PWR6 models, the latter being a 583 MWe 
plant, similar to the PWR12, but with non-trivial differences such as reductions in the number 
of primary coolant loops and cooling towers. Such discontinuities lead to the recommendation 
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that the CONCEPT code factors should be used for scaling of small power changes (<300 
MWe), while the EEDB-derived factors should be used for larger power differences (US 
Department of Energy, 1988, p. 29). It is for this reason that the EEDB-derived factors were 
employed in this model. These values are also supported by their comparability to others cited 
in relevant literature, such as EMWG (2007), NEA (2000), and Carelli, et al. (2010).  
Scaling was also applied to the site labour hours with the same scaling factors, based 
on the assumption that the site labour rates were not related to reactor power. As this was not 
done on a per unit power basis, Equation 3 was used. 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑒	𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟	ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠=>?@A8 = 	 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑒	𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟	ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠BACABAD>A ×	E 250𝑀𝑊1144𝑀𝑊L= 
Equation 3: Labour hours power scaling implementation 
2.6.3. Standardisation 
As the definition of standardisation in this model was the establishment of a fixed and 
repeated plant design and construction process, the scope of its implementation was limited to 
the reduction of plant design costs. Based on the code of account definitions, these were judged 
to be contained in the one three digit indirect cost account: 921 – Home Office Services. 
Consequently, a single standardisation factor of 0.2 was applied to this account. This reflects 
the assumed 80% reduction in engineering and design costs, which is supported by United 
Engineers’ own assessment of what is achievable (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 
1988a, p. 6.16).  
2.6.4. Modularisation 
To adjust the scaled SMR costs for modularisation, the following parameters were 
defined: 
1. Modularisation percentage – the share of the costs in each account that are 
‘moved off-site’ and assigned to module production; 
2. Structural material increase factor, 1.05 – the increase in structural material 
costs for modularised share; 
3. Non-structural material reduction factor, 0.9 – the reduction in non-
structural material costs for modularised share; 
4. Shop productivity factor, 0.30 – the reduction in cost attributed to increase 
productivity in the module facility compared to on site; 
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5. Labour rate factor, 0.35 – the reduction in cost attributed to the lower cost of 
module facility labour compared to site labour. 
The modularisation percentages used for each account are shown in Appendix A. The 
percentages were applied at the three digit level, and were derived from the analysis done by 
Lloyd (2019). Essentially, Lloyd used dimensional transport constraints and specific 
modularisation schemes to estimate the maximum possible modularisation percentages for 
each cost account. For this study, a factor of 0.9 was applied to each percentage to take a non-
limiting case as the central assumption. For the shop productivity factor, the EMWG guidelines 
provide separate values for the ‘Nuclear island’ (0.3125) and the ‘Balance of Plant scope’ 
(0.2500); as the boundary of these two areas is not readily discernible within the EEDB data, a 
compromise between the two of 0.3000 is used. The labour rate factor of 0.35 is based on the 
ratio of field and shop labour rates given in the guidelines, and the material increase/reduction 
factor values are also taken directly from the guidelines (Economic Modeling Working Group, 
2007, pp. 110-112).  
Equations 4 - 9 show the calculations steps that are applied to each direct cost account, 
a, based on the process given in the guidelines (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007, p. 
112): 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡? = 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡? 	× 		𝜇? 
Equation 4: Equipment costs allocated to modules 	𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝	𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙? = 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑒	𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙? 	× 	𝜇? 	× 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒/𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒	𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
Equation 5: Material costs allocated to module manufacturing 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝	𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟? = 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑒	𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟? 	× 𝜇? 	× 0.30	 × 0.35 
Equation 6: Labour costs allocated to module manufacturing 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝	𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑? = 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝	𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟? 	× 2 
Equation 7: Indirect costs associated with module manufacturing 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒	𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡?= (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡? + 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝	𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟? + 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝	𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙?+ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝	𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑?) × 0.02 
Equation 8: Module transportation costs 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒	𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛? = 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑒	𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 × 𝜇? × 0.05 
Equation 9: Module installation costs 
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For each account, the shop material, labour, and overhead costs are recorded as separate 
cost categories; the shop equipment costs remain under the Factory category; module 
installation costs are added to the remaining site labour costs. Module freight costs however 
are aggregated together in the Transportation account (Account 915). 
For the indirect cost accounts subject to modularisation, the costs were reduced in 
proportion to the aggregate reduction in site labour hours; for each direct cost account, the site 
labour hours were reduced by the corresponding modularisation percentage.  
2.6.5. Schedule reduction 
While no direct costs accounts are altered by schedule reduction, the relevant indirect 
cost accounts are multiplied by a schedule reduction factor. This factor is the ratio of the 
assumed modularised SMR build schedule and the assumed build schedule for a stick built 250 
MW SMR. The schedule reduction achieved by modularisation is the subject of detailed study 
by Lloyd (2019), using the build schedule from and critical path analysis of the UK’s Sizewell 
B construction project. Modularisation schedule reduction factors can be derived from the ratio 
of the stick built and modularised plant build times produced by Lloyd’s model. While the time 
values are specifically derived from the Sizewell B schedule, the change factors were judged 
suitable to be applied to the EEDB-derived data. The factors used in this study are shown in 
Table 6, along with their underpinning schedules. 
 
Unit Power (MW) 
Build Times (months) Schedule Reduction 
Factor Stick Built Modular Construction 
1198 79 70 0.89 
500 66 50 0.76 
250 59 40 0.68 
100 54 34 0.63 
Table 6: Modular construction schedule reduction factors (Lloyd, 2019) 
The reference build time is the sum of the construction and start-up times for the 
PWR12-ME model. To determine the build time for a stick-built SMR, power scaling is applied 
in the same manner as for labour hours in Equation 3. The scaling factor was derived by 
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comparing the PWR12-BE build schedule to that of the PWR6-BE model, both from the EEDB 
(United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a, p. 6.17). The start-up time is constant at 6 
months, irrespective of reactor power or experience range; consequently power scaling was 
only applied to construction time. The result of the construction time power scaling was a 76 
month total build time for a stick built 250 MW SMR. The application of the 0.68 schedule 
reduction factor yielded a modularised SMR build time of 51 months.  
 
PWR12-BE Construction Time 72 months 
PWR6-BE Construction Time 62 months 
Schedule Power Scaling Factor 0.22 
PWR12-ME Construction Time 98 months 
Stick built 250 MW SMR Construction Time 70 months 
Start-up Time 6 months 
Stick built 250 MW SMR Build Time 76 months 
250MW Modularisation Schedule Change Factor 0.68 
Modularised 250 MW SMR Build Time 51 months 
Table 7: Derivation of stick built and modularised SMR build times 
2.6.6. Learning 
As shown in Figure 9, learning cost reduction is applied to several cost categories in 
this model. In all cases, costs for each unit are determined using Equation 1 (yielding marginal 
unit cost), but the learning rate employed in each instance varies. 
For the reduction of labour, material, and associated indirect costs incurred on the plant 
construction site, a fixed learning rate of 2% is used. This is based on guidance from the Cost 
Estimate Guidelines produced by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Delene & Hudson II, 1993, 
p. 14), and reflects the relatively poor conditions for learning associated with construction sites. 
For learning occurring in component factories and module manufacturing facilities, the 
learning rate used is determined through a two-step process. Firstly, the rate of production of 
reactor units determines a normal distribution of learning rates, defined by a mean and standard 
deviation. Secondly, the relationship between the component/module supplier and the reactor 
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vendor determines the learning rate from its position on this distribution. The explanation of 
the supplier relationship types and their resultant learning rates are provided in Section 3.3. 
The relationship between production rate and learning rate employed in this model was 
built up from a combination of works from the literature. A study by the University of Chicago 
(2004) describes the conditions required for different learning rates, including production rate. 
The study associates low learning rates with the production of 1 unit per year or slower, and 
high learning rates with ‘continuous construction’. Low levels of learning, and possibly even 
cost increases, can be explained for low production rates due to forgetting – the loss of the 
labour knowledge and skills that delivered the cost improvements. The balance between 
learning and forgetting is discussed in detail by Benkard (2000) in the context of aircraft 
production, and succinctly illustrated by Figure 11; this shows not only the continuous cost 
reduction over the scale of 100 units, but also that as production rate falls, costs can start to 
increase again.   
 
 
Figure 11: Labour requirement and production rate for Lockheed’s L-1011 programme 
(Benkard, 2000, p. 1039) 
[Copyright American Economic Association; reproduced with permission of the American Economic Review] 
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Rosner and Goldberg (2011) envisaged continuous production in an SMR module 
manufacturing facility as yielding 12 units per year. McDonald & Schrattenholzer (2001) 
observed the mean learning rate for the production of energy technologies to be 15%; this was 
therefore taken to be the high learning rate associated with production of 12 units per year. 
Limited learning has been observed in large nuclear reactor construction, which has been partly 
attributed to low rates of construction (Roulstone, 2015b). The low learning rate associated 
with 1 unit per annum was therefore taken to be 2%.  
A logarithmic relationship was used to connect these two data points. The opportunities 
for learning are more greatly increased when moving from 2 to 4 units per year than from 10 
to 12; it was therefore judged that higher production rates had diminishing returns with regards 
to learning. The consequent relationship between learning rate and production rate used in this 
model is given in Equation 10 (Lyons & Roulstone, 2018). 
 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛	𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = (5.3467	 ×	 ln(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)) + 1.6944 
Equation 10: Production rate – learning rate relationship 
2.6.7. Interest during construction 
The interest accrued during construction is calculated by assuming uniform spending 
throughout the construction period, and compounding the interest annually.  
2.6.8. Operation and maintenance costs 
The operation and maintenance (O&M) costs for an SMR are derived in this model 
from a set of reference costs provided by Lazard (2017). This report divides O&M costs into 
fixed and variable costs. Mott MacDonald (2010) explain that fixed O&M costs are made up 
of the following: 
• ‘operating labour’; 
• ‘planned and unplanned maintenance (additional labour, spares and 
consumables)’; 
• ‘through life (time dependent) capital maintenance’; 
• ‘property taxes (rates), insurance and network use of system charges’ (Mott 
MacDonald, 2010, p. 4). 
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To determine the fixed O&M costs for a 250MW SMR, it was assumed that non-labour 
contributions had the same specific costs (per MW) as the reference data from Lazard (2017), 
while the labour contribution was scaled. This was done to reflect the non-linear relationship 
between manning levels of reactor units and their power output. The specific labour cost for an 
SMR was determined using Equation 11, which is based on the manning-power relationship 
(Equation 4.3.12) provided by Rothwell (2016, p. 116). This relationship is the result of a 
‘semi-log’ regression model, using data from operating plants in the US provided by the Idaho 
National Laboratory (INL, 2004, based on Rothwell, 2016). 
 𝑺𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄	𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒓	𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕= 	 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆	𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄	𝒍𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒖𝒓	𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕	($	𝒑𝒆𝒓	𝑴𝑾)𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆	𝒔𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄	𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈	𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍	(#	𝒑𝒆𝒓	𝑴𝑾)	×	𝒆{𝟓.𝟓𝟒𝟕	(𝟎.𝟖𝟕𝟎	×𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕	𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆(𝑮𝑾))𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕	𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆	(𝑴𝑾)  
Equation 11: Specific labour cost calculation 
The variable O&M costs are mainly related to fuel and ‘output related repair and 
maintenance’ (Mott MacDonald, 2010, p. 4). In this model, the cost of decommissioning is 
turned into a generation charge, thus adding to the variable O&M cost. This reflects the practice 
in some markets whereby utilities make payments into a decommissioning fund during 
operation to cover the costs of plant dismantling and clean-up.    
2.6.9. LCOE  
The LCOE is determined by applying Equation 12 to Equation 14, which implement a 
pre-tax methodology based on that employed by the UK Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy.  
 𝑵𝒆𝒕	𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕	𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆	𝒐𝒇	𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍	𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔= 	 (𝑷𝒓𝒆 − 𝒅𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕	𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔 + 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏	𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔)𝒕(𝟏 + 𝒓)(𝒕M𝟏)𝒕+ (𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏	𝒂𝒏𝒅	𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆	𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔)𝒕(𝟏 + 𝒓)𝒕𝒕  
Equation 12: Discounting of lifetime costs (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy, 2016, p. 8) 
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𝑵𝒆𝒕	𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕	𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆	𝒐𝒇	𝑬𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚	𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 	 𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚	𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒕(𝟏 + 𝒓)𝒕𝒕  
Equation 13: Discounting of electricity generation (Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy, 2016, p. 8) 
 𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑬 =	 𝑵𝒆𝒕	𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕	𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆	𝒐𝒇	𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍	𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒔𝑵𝒆𝒕	𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕	𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆	𝒐𝒇	𝑬𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒚	𝑮𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
Equation 14: LCOE calculation (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2016, 
p. 8) 
The funds to cover costs incurred during the development and construction phases of the plant 
lifecycle are assumed to be drawn down from the beginning of each year; consequently this 
costs are discounted from the start of the year they are incurred; all other costs and revenues 
are discounted from the end of the year in which they are incurred. 
2.6.10. Model parameters and assumptions  
Table 8 summarises the fixed parameters in the model; the sensitivities of the model 
outputs to these parameters are discussed in Section 2.8. Further to these, there are several 
assumptions that underpin the design and implementation of the cost model; these are 
summarised in Table 9. 
 
Fixed Parameter Value Source 
Cost-weighted scaling factor 0.65 (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a) 
Owner’s costs rate (%) 10 (US Department of Energy, 1988) 
Contingency rate (%) 15 (US Department of Energy, 1988) 
Cost-weighted modularisation percentage 76 (Lloyd, 2019) 
Structural material module increase factor 1.05 (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007) 
Non-structural material module decrease factor 0.9 (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007) 
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Fixed Parameter Value Source 
Module shop productivity factor 0.3 (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007) 
Module shop labour rate factor 0.35 (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007) 
Shop overhead rate (%) 200 (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007) 
Module freight rate (%) 2 (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007) 
Module installation rate (%) 5 (Economic Modeling Working Group, 2007) 
Standardisation (%) 80 (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a) 
Interest rate (%) 9.6 (Lazard, 2017) 
Build schedule (months) 51 (US Department of Energy, 1988); (Lloyd, 2019) 
Pre-development period (years) 3.5 (United Engineers & Constructors Inc., 1988a) 
Pre-development capital cost share (%) 0.79 (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2013) 
Plant operational lifetime (years) 60 (Lazard, 2017) 
Staff fixed O&M cost share (%) 66.9 (Rothwell, 2016) 
Variable O&M cost ($/MWh) 0.75 (Lazard, 2017) 
Capacity factor (%) 90.2 (Lazard, 2017) 
Fuel cost ($/MWh) 8.9 (Lazard, 2017) 
Decommissioning cost ($/MWh) 2 
(Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial 
Strategy, 2016) 
Table 8: Fixed parameter values  
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Model Assumption Supported Model Element 
SMR design/technology is largely similar to the reference 
design (i.e. dispersed PWR) 
Scaling 
Fixed O&M costs 
Costs/revenue accrue uniformly across the relevant 
lifecycle phase LCOE calculation 
Table 9: Model assumptions 
 Demonstration Results    
In this section a set of calculated costs for a 250 MW SMR are presented to demonstrate 
the separate stages of the cost model. These results are based on the modelling assumptions 
detailed in Section 2.6.9, as well as a simplified supply chain model: one SMR vendor and 
module manufacturing facility are assumed; the manufacturing of all factory made components 
and modules is subject to the mean learning rate yielded from Equation 10. 
2.7.1. First production unit 
Table 10 gives the cost category breakdown of the OCC for the reference plant, along 
with the calculated OCC breakdown for the 250 MW SMR, both after scaling (representing a 
stick built plant) and after the effects of modularisation and standardisation. For each cost 
category, the specific capital cost is given, along with its percentage share of the OCC. As both 
the reference plant and scaled SMR are assumed to be stick built, no module shop costs are 
included. 
The costs of the scaled SMR highlight why a small stick built plant is unlikely to be 
economically competitive; while the 250 MW SMR has a lower absolute capital cost than the 
reference large reactor (approximately $2.6bn compared to $7bn), this amounts to almost 
double the specific overnight capital cost. When factoring in interest during construction to 
give Total Capital Cost, the scaled SMR benefits from a shorter stick built construction 
schedule which moderates the increase in financing cost arising from the increase in underlying 
specific capital used.  
When then considering the OCC breakdown of the modularised and standardised SMR, 
Table 10 highlights two points. Firstly, the overall cost reduction resulting from these 
construction changes makes the SMR competitive with the large reference plant. Secondly, 
while there is minimal change in the distribution of costs across the categories from the 
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reference plant to the scaled SMR, there is a significant shift with the modularised and 
standardised SMR. Most notably, the factory share has nearly doubled, and by adding in the 
new module shop cost categories, nearly 45% of the OCC is subject to the conditions for high 
production learning. This emphasises how both modularisation and standardisation are 
enablers of learning: the former moving work from unproductive construction sites to the 
controlled conditions of a factory; the latter allowing for repetition. 
 
Cost Category 
Reference 
(1,144 MW) 
Scaled SMR 
(250MW) 
Modularised & 
Standardised 
SMR (250MW) 
 2017 $/kW Share 2017 $/kW Share 2017 $/kW Share 
Factory 1,014 17% 1,743 16% 1,743 30% 
Site Labour 964 16% 1,752 17% 475 8% 
Site Material 288 5% 536 5% 141 2% 
Indirect Site Labour 367 6% 588 6% 369 6% 
Indirect Services 2,195 36% 3,736 35% 1,108 19% 
Module Shop Labour n/a n/a n/a n/a 141 2% 
Module Shop Material n/a n/a n/a n/a 388 7% 
Module Shop Overhead n/a n/a n/a n/a 282 5% 
Owner's Costs 483 8% 835 8% 465 8% 
Contingency 797 13% 1,378 13% 767 13% 
Total OCC 6,108 100% 10,568 100% 5,878 100% 
Table 10: OCC Breakdown for Reference Data, Scaled SMR, and Modularised & Standardised 
SMR (January 2017 $/kW) 
Figure 12 shows the corresponding TCC values for the three notional plants, along with 
the share of the overall cost reduction that is directly attributable to standardisation, 
modularisation, and schedule reduction; it should be noted here that the schedule reduction is 
itself a result of modularisation, as the movement of specific activities off-site reduces the 
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critical path of construction. Correspondingly, the cost reduction from modularisation thus 
refers specifically to the productivity and labour rate savings from moving labour off-site. 
Taking the latter two effects as a pair, the dominance of the modularisation benefits is 
significant. Given that factory made component costs outweigh the module costs, 
standardisation is arguably the greater enabler of learning; however, it is clear that 
modularisation is crucial to bringing down the first unit costs, thus putting the SMR programme 
in a strong competitive position from the outset. Indeed, with IDC included, the cost advantage 
of the modularised and standardised SMR over the reference plant is more significant than just 
considering OCC. This result challenges the conventional thinking that smaller reactors will 
also be more expensive than large ones. 
 
 
Figure 12: TCC walk chart from reference plant to first 250 MW SMR unit 
When comparing the resultant LCOEs for the reference plant and first SMR unit shown 
in Figure 13, the effects of scale are again seen at play. While there is a reduction in levelised 
capital cost corresponding to the OCC and build schedule reductions, the scaling effect that 
governs the fixed operation and maintenance costs results in a near doubling of this cost 
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component. Nevertheless, the first SMR unit improves on the LCOE of the reference plant by 
approximately $40/MWh. 
      
 
Figure 13: LCOE breakdown for reference plant and first SMR unit 
2.7.2. Learning demonstration 
Figure 14 shows the cost reduction achieved by learning over the course of a 10 year 
programme, in which plants are produced at a rate of 5 units per year. The cost reduction is 
separated out into that resulting from factory learning (i.e. learning by component suppliers), 
module shop learning, and on site learning. As expected, the factory learning provides the 
greatest cost reduction; this is due to two factors. Firstly, both the factory and module shop 
costs are subject to the higher learning rate of 10.3%, given by the production rate, compared 
to the fixed site learning rate of 2%. Secondly, as shown in Table 10 the factory share of the 
OCC of the first unit is more than double that of the module shop, meaning that there is a 
greater base cost to reduce.  
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Figure 14: TCC walk chart over 10 year, 12.5GW programme 
Figure 15 shows the effect on TCC reduction that comes from varying the production 
rate. Over the first 4 years of the programme in which 5 GW of plants are produced, only 
approximately 61% of the cost reduction achieved at 5 units per year is realised at 2 units per 
year. On the other hand, if the rate is increased to 8 units per year, the cost reduction achieved 
increases by approximately 18%. The apparent diminishing returns in terms of cost reduction 
against production rate is due to the logarithmic relationship between learning rate and 
production rate, as shown by Equation 10. This is further clarified by Table 11, which shows 
the individual learning rates used at the different production rates, and the resultant aggregate 
learning rates derived from the overall OCC reduction. 
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Figure 15: Resultant learning curves for different production rates 
  
Production Rate 2 units/year 5 units/year 8 units/year 
Factory Learning Rate 5.4% 10.3% 12.8% 
Module Shop Learning Rate 5.4% 10.3% 12.8% 
Site Learning Rate 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 
Aggregate OCC Learning Rate 3.4% 5.6% 6.5% 
Table 11: Resultant learning rates for demonstration cases 
 Sensitivities 
As discussed in Section 2.6.9, the cost model described in this chapter is built on a 
significant number of fixed parameters and assumptions. In order to understand the significance 
of these assumptions to the final cost produced, a set of sensitivity results are presented in this 
section. For each parameter, the assumed value shown in Table 8 was increased and decreased 
by 10% in isolation; the consequent variations in first unit TCC and LCOE were recorded.  
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It should be noted that the parameter values were varied in such a way as to reflect an 
increase/decrease in the effect of the parameter, rather than just the value itself. For example, 
the 10% increase in the standardisation factor represented a 10% increase in the effect of 
standardisation, which is to reduce cost; the actual value of the parameter was decreased from 
0.2 to 0.12 in the model implementation. It should also be noted that both the scaling factors 
and modularisation percentages, while varying across the four digit accounts, were each 
changed by 10% individually to give a 10% variation in the cost-weighted averages of these 
parameters.  
2.8.1. Total Capital Cost 
 
Figure 16: Sensitivity of TCC to parameter values 
The sensitivity of the first unit TCC to the fixed parameters in the model is shown in 
Figure 16; parameters that had no bearing on TCC are not included. The TCC is most sensitive 
to the scaling factors, which highlights why the economies of scale have been seen as such a 
challenge to SMR economic competitiveness. The TCC is also particularly sensitive to the 
modularisation percentages, which can be explained by the multiple effects it has. By 
increasing the degree of modularisation, a larger portion of the direct costs is reduced by 
increased productivity and wage decreases; the associated indirect costs are also further 
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reduced. While both affecting the IDC values, the build time has a greater influence on TCC 
than the interest rate, due to its influence on the time-based indirect site costs.  
2.8.2. Levelised Cost of Electricity 
The sensitivity of the first unit LCOE to the fixed parameters in the model is shown in 
Figure 17. Due to the inclusion of operation and maintenance, fuel, and decommissioning costs, 
variation of any of the parameters included in Figure 16 has less of an effect on the LCOE, 
except for the build time and interest rate. These latter two parameters have a direct bearing on 
the levelised value of the additional cost elements, as well as the capital cost. Any increase in 
the build time delays operation, and so reduces the value of the revenue accrued from electricity 
generation. Similarly, an increase in the interest rate decreases the value of all costs and 
revenues, and to a greater extent on later cash flows. Since the majority of costs are incurred 
earlier in the lifetime of a plant (i.e. during construction), the net effect of a higher interest rate 
is to decrease the value of revenues more than cost, and thus raise the LCOE. 
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Figure 17: Sensitivity of LCOE to parameter values 
The greater significance of early cash flows over late ones explains the high sensitivity 
of the LCOE to variations in the pre-development period, compared to that of the plant 
operational lifetime. As is shown in Figure 13, the sum of the variable operation and 
maintenance, fuel, and decommissioning costs amounts to only 9% of the first unit LCOE, thus 
giving relatively insignificant sensitivities. Moreover, the significant share of the LCOE 
coming from the fixed compared to variable operation and maintenance costs explains the high 
sensitivity to the capacity factor: the vast majority of costs are incurred regardless of how much 
electricity is generated, so capacity factor needs to be maximised to keep the LCOE down. 
Indeed, this is why nuclear power plants have conventionally served as baseload electricity 
providers.  
-12% -8% -4% 0% 4% 8% 12%
Scaling factor
Owner’s costs rate
Contingency rate
Modularisation percentage
Structural material module increase factor
Non-structural material module decrease factor
Module shop productivity factor
Module shop labour rate factor
Shop overhead rate
Module freight rate
Module installation rate
Standardisation factor
Interest rate
Build time*
Pre-development period*
Plant operational lifetime
Variable O&M cost
Capacity factor
Fuel cost
Decommissioning cost
Change in first SMR unit LCOE
−10% +10%
*Build time and pre-development 
period varied by +/− 1 year
 60 
 
2.8.3. Build time and pre-development period sensitivities 
For both sets of sensitivities shown in the previous sections, the build time and pre-
development period were varied by +/− 1 year, rather than 10% as done for the other 
parameters. This was done to avoid the misleading results that arise from the discounting 
method, highlighted by Figure 18.  
 
 
Figure 18: LCOE pre-development period sensitivity 
An increase in the pre-development period is expected to result in a very minor increase 
in the LCOE, because the revenues from electricity generation are delayed just slightly more 
than the upfront costs. When the build time is an integer year length, this is the trend observed. 
However when the build time is not an integer year length, variations in the pre-development 
period can cause the build phase to vary in the number of discounting years it spans. This in 
turn causes a greater reduction in the discount factor applied to construction costs compared to 
other elements, most crucially the energy generation, thus resulting in decreasing rather than 
increasing LCOE.    
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 Cost model comparison 
As no real cost data is available for an established SMR production programme, in order 
to provide a degree of validation for the cost model, a comparison was made to other cost 
estimates in the literature. Specifically, the Energy Technologies Institute’s nuclear cost drivers 
report (Energy Technologies Institute, 2018) provides a useful benchmark due to its use of 
reference data which is closely related to that of this model. The ETI references the EEDB’s 
PWR12 Median Experience data, but uses the older Phase VIII update costs compared to the 
Phase IX cost employed in this model.   
The objective of the ETI’s project was to ‘identify and quantify potential to deliver 
meaningful reductions in capital cost and levelised cost of energy (LCOE) in the UK’ (Energy 
Technologies Institute, 2018, p. 2). To do this, the project team collated a set of cost estimates 
for past, in progress, and proposed nuclear plant projects, defined a set of key cost drivers, and 
then scored each project against these cost drivers based on interviews about the plant 
construction (Energy Technologies Institute, 2018, p. 3). This yielded a cost model which is 
able to quantify the cost reduction by varying the strength of the different cost drivers. The 8 
key cost drivers and selected cost reduction strategies identified in the report are summarised 
in Table 12, along with the relevant component of this cost model.  
A key conclusion of the report quantified the potential for cost reduction in the 
construction of conventional large reactors, using the aforementioned ETI cost model. Starting 
with the average costs of ‘Gen III/III+ reactors in Europe and North America’, with the worst 
scores for each cost driver, changing each score to the global average ‘would result in a cost 
reduction of at least 35%’ (Energy Technologies Institute, 2018, pp. 39-40). Given the 
similarity in the cost drivers considered by the two models, as well as the employment of 
closely related reference costs, this result serves as a relevant comparison to test the 
reasonableness of the cost reductions predicted in this study.   
In order to compare the cost model from this study to the ETI study, cost reduction on 
the reference 1,144 MW plant was modelled; the reference cost data was not scaled. To reflect 
the decreased scope for modularisation and schedule reduction for this large plant compared to 
a 250 MW SMR, the corresponding modularisation percentages shown in Appendix A were 
used, as was the gigawatt scale schedule reduction factor shown in Table 6. The latter gave a 
modular construction build time of 92 months, compared to the stick built reference build time 
of 104 months. A 7% interest rate was used to match the ETI study; otherwise the parameters 
used were the same as in Table 8. 
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ETI Cost Driver ETI Cost Reduction Strategy Relevant Model Component 
‘Project Governance and 
Project Development’ ‘follow contracting best practices’ 
Supply chain 
design 
‘Construction Execution’ ‘leverage offsite fabrication’ Modularisation 
‘Political and Regulatory 
Context’ 
‘design a UK program to maximise and 
incentivise learning’ Learning 
‘Equipment and Materials’ ‘follow best practices to reduce material use’ Modularisation 
‘Supply Chain’ 
‘embrace a highly proactive approach to 
supply chain management and 
qualification’ 
Supply chain 
design 
‘Vendor Plant Design’ 
‘complete design prior to starting 
construction’; 
‘design for constructability’ 
‘Increasing modularity in the design 
should be prioritised’ 
‘Design for plant design reuse’ 
Standardisation 
 
Modularisation 
‘Labour’ ‘Improve labour productivity’ Modularisation 
‘Operation’ ‘Develop excellence in plant operations and maintenance’ n/a 
Table 12: Summary of ETI Report cost reduction findings (Energy Technologies Institute, 2018, 
pp. 37-38) 
The resultant first unit TCC cost reductions are shown in Figure 19. Given the lower 
specific cost compared to the scaled SMR, and the lesser scope for both modularisation and 
schedule reduction, the cost reductions achieved are unsurprisingly lower than those shown for 
the 250 MW SMR in Figure 12. The learning cost reductions over 10 units, based on a 
production rate of 5 units per year, are shown in Figure 20. After 10 units, the overall cost 
reduction from learning amounts to 13.12% of the first unit TCC. In contrast, for the 250 MW 
SMR produced at the same rate, the cost reduction after 10 units was 18.20% of the first unit 
TCC. This further emphasises the effect of modularisation on learning cost reduction; while 
the same learning rates were applied to the three settings in both cases, the reduced 
modularisation scope of the large reactor results in lower aggregate learning.  
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Figure 19: TCC walk chart for cost reduction of a 1,144MW plant 
 
Figure 20: TCC walk chart over 10 units 
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Table 13 summarises the total cost reduction from the reference plant to the 10th 
production unit of the modularised and standardised 1,144MW plant, showing the individual 
contributions of the cost reduction methods and their cumulative effect. Before any learning, 
the cumulative cost reduction from improvements to the construction process amounts to 29%.  
 
 TCC (2017 $/kW) Reduction Cumulative Reduction 
Reference 1,144MW Plant 8,760 0% 0% 
After Standardisation 7,742 -12% -12% 
After Modularisation 6,579 -13% -25% 
After Schedule Reduction 6,224 -4% -29% 
After 10 Units (5 units/year) 5,408 -9% -38% 
Table 13: TCC reduction for 1,144MW plant 
At a production rate of 5 units per year, giving an aggregate OCC learning rate of 4.1%, the 
additional cost reduction brings the cumulative savings to 38%. If the production rate is 
dropped to just 2 units per year, giving an aggregate OCC learning rate of 2.7%, the cumulative 
cost reduction is reduced to 35%; the effect of further variation is shown in Table 14. These 
results are strikingly similar to those of the ETI.   
 
Aggregate OCC Learning Rate 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 
Cumulative TCC Reduction -31% -34% -36% -38% -40% 
Table 14: Effect of aggregate OCC learning variation 
 Model limitations discussion 
While the sensitivity analysis in Section 2.8 shows the influence of the assumptions and 
fixed parameters in the model, and the comparison with the ETI study in Section 2.9 gives 
confidence that the model results are reasonable, the model has limitations that need to be 
considered.  
As already mentioned, the scaling factors used in this model are taken from the Nuclear 
Energy Cost Data Base of the US Department of Energy, and are provided at the two digit 
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account level. While this provides more detail than a single cost-weight average aggregate 
scaling factor, it still requires uniform application across the four digit direct and three digit 
indirect accounts. The same applies to a lesser extent to the modularisation percentages, which 
are specified at the three digit account level. One must therefore be wary of looking at four 
digit account costs in isolation, as they may be distorted by the averaging of these parameters. 
Furthermore, learning is applied at the four digit level, and the resultant cost reduction is 
directly related to the factory and module cost share, which in turn is driven by the scaling 
factors and modularisation percentages; consequently, these distortions may be exacerbated 
further down the learning curve.  
A further limitation deriving from the scaling factors relates to their applicability to 
different reactor sizes. As explained in Section 2.6.2, the Nuclear Energy Cost Data Base 
provides two sets of scaling factors to be used for different extents of reactor power variation. 
Again, the same applies to the modularisation percentages, as the greater physical dimensions 
and weights inherent in larger plants reduce the scope for modularisation (Lloyd, 2019). This 
limits the cost model’s ability to project costs for a continuous range of reactor power; it is 
better suited for examination of particular cases. 
In all cases, the first unit cost reductions produced by the model are separated out into 
those resulting from Standardisation, Modularisation, and Schedule Reduction. This would 
imply that these effects can be taken, and indeed varied in isolation. However, these effects are 
inherently coupled. In practical terms, the extent of standardisation will limit the 
modularisation scope, as it is only worthwhile to design and produce modules that will be 
repeated for multiple plants. It has previously been discussed how standardisation is an enabler 
of learning, in that it allows for repetition; however it also enables learning indirectly by 
creating the case for modularisation, which has also been shown as an enabler for learning. The 
consequence of this is that it would not be reasonable to apply the significant modularisation 
percentages without the high standardisation factor, even though these are operated as 
independent parameters in the model. Similarly, the assumed schedule reduction is a direct 
result of the impact of modularisation on the critical path of construction; while it would be 
possible to increase or decrease the extent of modularisation without affecting the schedule 
reduction, this would require detailed analysis as done by (Lloyd, 2019). Again, this limits the 
use of the model to specific cases of standardisation, modularisation, and schedule reduction, 
rather than continuous and independently varied ranges of each. 
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When considering the results of learning cost reduction, it is important to recognise that 
the observed learning rates that form the basis of the learning modelling are aggregate over 
production programmes. Moreover as a human activity, learning is inherently uncertain. 
Consequently, the projection of learning is better suited to estimation of long run cost 
reduction, rather than the specific savings realised over the first few units, and should be seen 
as the average reduction over a programme, rather than showing the specific reduction between 
each and every one of the units in the production run.   
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3. Supply Chain Theory and Practice 
As demonstrated in Section 2, cost reduction for SMRs depends on: standardising work, 
transferring work from low productivity sites to production shops, and using the large volumes 
of units to make this work more efficient through learning. In this way nuclear construction is 
changed from project-by-project site construction to a series of common designs largely made 
in factories and assembled at site; site labour is largely limited to delivering that which requires 
local customisation, such as foundations and cooling systems. This transformation is from one-
off site construction of projects to standard products delivered by a defined supply chain.  
The focus of reducing cost is therefore on production efficiency, production rates and 
the progressive reduction of cost through learning, Therefore, the structure of the supply chain 
needs to be explored and how production rates affect cost reduction. As explained in Section 
2.4.5, the learning rates applied to factory and module shop costs are determined by two factors: 
the production rate and the supply chain structure. While the influence of the production rate 
has already been discussed, this chapter explores the theoretical background to supply chain 
design, and how supply chain structure is parameterised in this study.  
 Supply Chain Design 
Srai and Gregory (2008) define the configuration of a supply network (or supply chain) 
as the specific arrangements of its ‘key elements’, which are: 
 
1. ‘supply network structure’; 
2. ‘flow of material and information’; 
3. ‘role, inter-relationships, and governance between key network partners’; 
4. ‘“value-structure” of the product or service. (Srai & Gregory, 2008, p. 394) 
 
These key elements can be condensed further into two complementary aspects of a supply 
chain: the physical logistics and the relationships between supply chain actors. With regards to 
physical logistics, supply chain design concerns ‘the number and location of production 
facilities, the amount of capacity at each facility, the assignment of market region to one or 
more facilities, and supplier selection’ (Meixell & Gargeya, 2005, p. 532). With regards to 
supply chain relationships, supply chain design is built on fundamental procurement decisions: 
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having broken down the product or service into components, how will each component be 
procured?  
 Both aspects of supply chain configuration are explored in this study. With the idealised 
supply chain map described in Section 2.5, the consideration of physical logistics is limited to 
the number and location of module manufacturing facilities, the number of component 
suppliers, and localisation of the supply chain.  
The primary influence of these factors is on production rate and volume, as well as 
labour costs. Meanwhile supply chain relationships have a direct effect on the learning cost 
reduction applied in the cost model, as is explained in the following sections.  
 Supplier Relationship Types 
Christy and Grout (1994) present a framework for understanding different supplier 
relationships and why they are chosen, which is summarised in Figure 21. This framework is 
driven by two characteristics of the product or service that is being traded: product specificity 
and process specificity. 
 
 
Figure 21: Supplier relationship framework (Christy & Grout, 1994, p. 237) 
Product specificity relates to the needs of the buyer, deriving from the intended use of 
the product or service; the product specificity:  
[Republished with permission of Elsevier Science & Technology Journals; permission conveyed 
through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.] 
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‘may be manifest in its design, material required, service mix requirements, 
conformance requirements, or timeliness measures’ (Christy & Grout, 1994, p. 236).  
For example in the context of a nuclear power plant, the design and manufacturing 
characteristics of a steam generator would equate to high product specificity, whereas a chair 
in the plant control room would have relatively low product specificity. Process specificity 
relates to the needs of the supplier, deriving from the production process the supplier uses to 
provide the product or service. If the production process requires ‘specialised assets’, such as 
‘unique tooling’, that would deliver a loss in value if redeployed for an alternate use, then 
process specificity is high (Christy & Grout, 1994, p. 236). On the other hand, if the production 
process only uses generic assets that have multiple uses, process specificity is low. 
These two specificities create risk for the buyer and supplier respectively. For the buyer 
in a high product specificity transaction, the risk is the failure of the supplier to deliver, whether 
on time or to the required quality standard. For the supplier, the risk of high process specificity 
transaction is that the buyer will not ultimately make the full purchase, or go elsewhere entirely 
(Christy & Grout, 1994, p. 236). As shown in Figure 21, when either specificity is high, the 
party bearing the risk seeks contracting arrangements to act as a safeguard; these are the 
conditions that result in single, long term supply agreements. When both specificities are low, 
neither party needs the reassurance of a long term commitment, which creates the opportunity 
for multiple competing suppliers. On the other hand, if both specificities are high, the risk to 
both parties is high enough that a more engaged partnership model might be pursued, if not full 
vertical integration.  
In many industries, the twin pressures of competition and globalisation have led to more 
complex supplier relationships. While selection of suppliers by competitive tender (lowest cost 
for the task) is still employed, the needs to: aggregate volumes, to progressively reduce product 
and interface cost and to be more responsive to customers - has led to new structures. This 
framework thus presents four supplier relationship types: an integrated supplier (or in-house 
production), a single source supplier, multiple competing suppliers, or a value-adding 
partnership. While the first three are simple to understand, it is worth considering how the 
relationship between a buyer and a supplier ‘partner’ differs from that with a standard single 
supplier. 
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3.2.1. Supplier partnerships 
A ‘strategic supplier partnership’ is ‘designed to leverage the strategic and operational 
capabilities of individual participating organizations to help them achieve significant ongoing 
benefits’ (Li, et al., 2006, p. 110). This means that such suppliers not only participate in the 
engineering and design processes of the final product, but crucially are expected to ‘contribute 
to continuous improvement’ (Mahoney & Helper, 2017, p. 2). Stuart (1997) explains that ‘such 
arrangements are based on influence, trust and mutual values’ and require ‘a more intensive 
governance approach than would be the case for the transactional and adversarial buying 
approach’ (Stuart, 1997, p. 226).  
Examination of a specific example of such a relationship further illustrates what 
differentiates this type of arrangement. Project 13 is an initiative launched by the Institution 
for Civil Engineers to promote a new business model for infrastructure projects, which it refers 
to as an enterprise; its purpose is to improve productivity, with an emphasis on innovation 
(Institution for Civil Engineers, 2018). The enterprise model encompasses all parties in an 
infrastructure project, as shown in Figure 22, and the roles described are specific to that 
industry; nevertheless the nature of the relationships between suppliers and the 
owner/integrator are relevant to the more generic concept of a supplier partner. Most notably, 
suppliers are not just providers of a particular component or material, but also subject matter 
experts who are responsible for the development and deployment of their specialist skills 
throughout the project. Moreover, they share in both the risk and rewards of the whole product, 
not just their specific component. It can thus be understood that unlike single suppliers in 
traditional transactional relationships, supplier partners join an integrated team with the buyer 
and work collaboratively. As discussed in the following sections, this causes significant 
differences in the potential for learning between such enterprise partners and traditional 
suppliers. 
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Figure 22: Project 13 enterprise structure (Institution for Civil Engineers, 2018, p. 6) 
 Supplier Learning 
In order to determine the net learning cost reduction delivered to the SMR vendor, it is 
necessary to consider the difference between the price and cost, as highlighted by the Boston 
Consulting Group (1968) in their discussion of learning. There are separate cost and price 
experience curves, and while the latter is ‘coupled to the cost experience curve…it also reflects 
the sales and pricing strategies of the producers, the investors’ bargaining power, and market 
reactions to public deployment policies’ (International Energy Agency, 2000, p. 35). While 
broader factors might be worthy of inclusion when considering different market conditions, for 
the supply transactions in an SMR supply chain, three key factors were identified as most 
relevant to learning: innovation, the cost of interfaces, and value capture. Innovation relates 
directly to cost reduction, while the cost of interfaces and value capture influence the difference 
between cost and price. 
3.3.1. Innovation 
Innovation refers to the real changes that come out of learning, and reflects a supplier’s 
incentive and ability to deliver these. Strategos (2014) lay out the factors that influence the 
learning that can be achieved: 
 
[Republished with permission of the Institution of Civil Engineers] 
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• ‘management style and actions’; 
• ‘corporate culture’; 
• ‘organisation structure’; 
• ‘technology’; 
• ‘capital investment’; 
• ‘engineering’ (Strategos, 2014). 
 
For both a specialist integrated supplier and an enterprise partner, a high level of 
innovation would be expected. Both of these supplier types have the necessary expertise, and 
as their core business is in the production of the specific component, they have sufficient 
motivation to make the necessary investment, both financially and otherwise, to realise 
learning. For a non-specialist integrated supplier, while the motivation is present, the fact that 
the business is not set up specifically for the provision of this particular component means that 
it will struggle to produce at competitive costs. Indeed, the ‘Integrated (not specialist)’ supplier 
type can be seen as one that would not come out of competitive business design, but rather 
forced by external factors (such as political pressure from state actors). For external suppliers, 
a medium level of cost reduction would be expected. As specialists in a competitive market, 
these suppliers have both the motivation and ability to learn. However compared to integrated 
suppliers and enterprise partners, these suppliers cannot make improving performance for this 
particular component as high a priority, due to the need to balance investment between different 
products/customers.  
3.3.2. Cost of interfaces 
In any transaction, there will be costs associated with the interaction between the buyer 
and seller. Grover and Malhotra (2003) refer to these as coordination costs, and give by way 
of example ‘costs of exchanging information on products, price, availability, demand, as well 
as costs to exchange design changes rapidly with the supplier’ (Grover & Malhotra, 2003, p. 
459). For an integrated supplier which is part of the vendor organisation, these costs do not 
exist by definition. As enterprise partners work with the vendor in an integrated team, the cost 
of interfaces would similarly be expected to be low. Otherwise, it is clear that these costs will 
be higher when working with multiple suppliers as opposed to one, as information sharing 
activities will have to be duplicated. These varying cost of interfaces are incorporated into the 
model as a reduction in the net learning yielded to the SMR vendor.  
 73 
 
3.3.3. Value capture 
After the extra costs inherent in supplier transactions are factored into learning cost 
reduction, there is still the potential for disparity between the actual cost incurred by the 
supplier and the price given to the buyer. This is the result of value capture, and is a reflection 
of the power of a supplier to command profit for their work. Value capture in the context of 
learning is thus not different from the generic profit making ability of any business or industry. 
Therefore, the Five Forces Model presented by Porter (1985) is relevant to understanding the 
potential for value capture. 
Porter describes five competitive forces, summarised in Figure 23, that in combination 
determine how competitive an industry is, and thus how much profit actors in that market can 
retain; a greater degree of competition means that firms must yield more value to their 
customers if they are to compete. The five forces are: 
 
1. ‘the threat of new entrants’ – if it is easy for new competitors to enter the market, 
competition is higher; 
2. ‘the threat of substitutes’ – if customers can meet their needs easily with 
alternative (rather than directly competing) products/services, competition is 
higher; 
3. ‘the bargaining power of buyers’ – the stronger the power of customers, the 
more value must be yielded to them; 
4. ‘the bargaining power of suppliers’ – the stronger the power of suppliers, the 
less value is passed down the supply chain; 
5. ‘rivalry among the existing competitors’ (Porter, 1985, pp. 4-5). 
 
This model is presented as a framework for determining the attractiveness of entering 
a new market, and so the forces are presented from the perspective of a business making such 
a consideration. Nevertheless, the attractiveness in question ultimately equates to profitability 
and so can be translated to the issue of value capture.  
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Figure 23: Porter’s Five Forces Model (Porter, 1985, p. 6)  
For integrated suppliers, there is inherently no value capture because they are part of 
the vendor organisation. For enterprise partners, a degree of value capture, or rather profit 
sharing, is expected as this is what is traded for the risk-sharing and innovation. For single 
traditional transactional suppliers, a distinction is drawn between relationships where the 
balance of supplier and buyer power falls to the buyer, and where it falls to the supplier; in the 
latter case, the supplier is expected uniquely to capture all of the cost savings realised from 
learning; in the former case, the degree of buyer power necessitates some savings being passed 
down the supply chain, but the level of value capture would still be high.  While Porter provides 
an extensive list of factors that contribute to buyer and supplier power (Porter, 1985, p. 6), in 
this model the focus is on the significance of the buyer’s purchase to the supplier’s overall 
business; if the buyer is a major customer for the supplier, buyer power is stronger; if the buyer 
is a relatively minor customer to the supplier, than supplier power dominates. 
In the case of multiple suppliers, the competitive rivalry between them reduces the 
value capture. This is further differentiated by the judgement that suppliers may still be able to 
capture some value when providing safety critical or otherwise complex components; in this 
case, value capture would expected to be at a medium level, compared to that for suppliers of 
relatively simple components, who would only be able to retain minimal value. 
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3.3.4. Net learning rate 
The differentiation between single source suppliers in the presence of buyer or supplier 
power, and multiple suppliers providing either simple or complex components, results in a total 
of 7 supplier relationship types. Table 15 shows how each supplier relationship type was scored 
against the three factors described above. For each factor a score of 1, 2, or 3 was assigned, the 
sum of which was used to determine the relative net learning rate for the supplier type, as shown 
in Table 2. The mean learning rate, μ, is determined in the cost model by the production rate, 
as described in Section 2.6.6. The standard deviation, σ, is determined by Equation 15, which 
relates the standard deviation to the mean by a fixed Coefficient of Variation; this in turn was 
derived from a normal distribution of learning rates estimated from gas turbine investment cost 
data (McDonald & Schrattenholzer, 2001, p. 257). This is part of the same data used for the 
establishment of the learning rate – production rate relationship, but the gas turbine learning 
rates were isolated for three reasons. Firstly, by limiting the data to one technology, variations 
in cost structures and manufacturing processes are avoided. Secondly, compared to some other 
included technologies (such as full power plants), the gas turbine category was judged to be 
dominated by factory costs. Thirdly, the measure used to determine the learning rates was 
specifically investment cost, as opposed to price, which avoids the complicating factor of 
outside market forces skewing the measured learning.  
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Supplier Relationship 
Type Description Innovation 
Cost of 
Interfaces 
Value 
Capture 
Net 
Learning 
Rate 
Integrated 
(specialist) 
In-house supplier High (3) None (3) None (3) High (9) 
Integrated 
(not specialist) 
In-house supplier Low (1) None (3) None (3) Medium (7) 
Enterprise partner 
Enterprise 
partner, engaged 
with vendor 
High (3) Low (3) Medium (2) High (8) 
Multiple Source 
(simple component) 
Competing 
suppliers Medium (2) High (1) Low (3) Medium (6) 
Multiple Source 
(complex component) 
Competing 
suppliers Medium (2) High (1) Medium (2) Low (5) 
Single Source 
(buyer power) 
Supplier for 
whom vendor is 
major customer 
Medium (2) Medium (2) High (1) Low (5) 
Single Source 
(supplier power) 
Supplier for 
whom vendor is 
minor customer 
Medium (2) Medium (2) All None 
Table 15: Summary of supplier relationship types 
 
Total Score Net Learning Rate 
8 – 9 
High  
(µ + σ) 
6 – 7 
Medium  
(µ) 
3 – 5 
Low  
(μ - σ) 
Table 16: Net learning rate allocation scheme 
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𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑	𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝜎 = 	E 5.131814.9667L ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛	𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
Equation 15: Learning rate standard deviation calculation	 
 Overview of the Global Nuclear Supply Chain 
The nuclear industry has changed greatly during the last twenty years, driven by the 
hiatus in new plant ordering. Factories have been closed and engineering teams combined so 
that there is a small number of reactor vendors and component suppliers. These vendors and 
suppliers have become more international in pursuit of the limited number of orders and the 
centre of gravity of the industry has moved towards the Far East where the majority of new 
build has occurred in the last decade. The nuclear industry is seeking a better balance between 
national priorities, perceived nuclear safety constraints, and economics; this is reflected in the 
number of nuclear vendors and their supply chains. Economics will be the key driver for small 
modular reactors (SMRs), as their purpose is to overcome the cost problem that large nuclear 
plants face. This raises the question of how to best design a supply chain to deliver the much 
lower level of costs and shorter build timescale required to make SMRs competitive? 
As the NEA explains, the importance of the supply chain to the ultimate economic 
competitiveness of nuclear power plants can be attributed to the high contribution of capital 
costs to the final levelised cost of electricity, and in turn ‘the large share of capital costs that is 
accounted for by the supply chain’ (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2015, p. 145). Large NPPs have 
traditionally been stick-built: the main structures are constructed from raw materials on site, 
with large components manufactured off-site in factories and shipped in. Figure 24 shows a 
percentage breakdown of the total overnight capital cost of building an NPP. ‘Overnight’ refers 
to the notion of building the plant essentially instantaneously; this ignores the significant cost 
of financing construction activities over the multi-year build times typical of nuclear power 
plants. It can be seen that the cost of procured equipment represents approximately 48% of the 
total build cost. 
 78 
 
 
 
Figure 24: NPP Cost Breakdown (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2015, p. 146) 
Before considering the possible supply chain configurations that could be employed in 
the production of small modular reactor plants, it is important to understand the nature of the 
current nuclear supply chain used in the construction of conventional large reactor plants. There 
are a number of benefits to this: 
 
1. Current supply chain configurations may reveal limits on what is possible in 
SMR production; 
2. Strengths and weaknesses of particular configurations may be identifiable; 
3. Particular areas may be highlighted where SMR production has the opportunity 
to introduce practice that is new to the nuclear industry. 
 
The design of a supply chain traditionally revolves around ‘decisions regarding the 
number and location of production facilities, the amount of capacity at each facility, the 
assignment of each market region to one or more locations, and supplier selection’ (Meixell & 
Gargeya, 2005, p. 532). The nuclear industry has particular characteristics which complicate 
these decisions, such as the high degree of regulation, driving in particular high quality 
standards, and the political sensitivity of the technology, involving both public perception and 
national sovereignty. The relatively low volume of production and long build times are also 
important factors, and indeed these are ones SMRs are intended to disrupt.   
[Republished with permission of OECD; permission conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.] 
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The construction of nuclear power plants requires a reactor designer (vendor) who may 
make some key parts of the plant and a large number of contractors with varied skills, working 
together over many years. These companies together with the owner, who is usually the 
operator of the completed plant, are collectively considered to be the nuclear supply chain. 
3.4.1. Organisational Structure of the Nuclear Supply Chain 
Thomas (1988) provides descriptions and discussion of the nuclear industries in a 
number of countries: USA, FR Germany, France, and Canada. The focus is on the roles and 
relationships of the various players in the industries, thus providing insight into the overall 
structure of the nuclear supply chain. Thomas highlights five roles that vary in their distribution 
and relation across the different countries. These roles are as follows: 
 
1. Vendor – the designer and proprietor, and to varying degrees manufacturer, of 
the nuclear reactor technology; in general, there will be a reactor vendor and a 
separate turbine generator/power conversion supplier; 
2. Architect-engineer – the organisation that arranges the detail design and 
coordinates the project; 
3. Constructor – the organisation responsible for the construction of the plant; 
4. Utility – the owner and operator of the plant; 
5. Regulator – the organisation responsible for the giving permission for the plant 
to be built and operated, enforcing regulations pertaining to the design, 
construction, and operation of the plant (Thomas, 1988, pp. 60-68). 
 
In some cases the same organisation will discharge more than one of these roles. A 
sixth role can also be recognised, given the unique bearing it has on nuclear power: the State. 
The sensitivity of nuclear technology, public concerns about nuclear safety, and the scale of 
the investment mean that, even for privately owned and funded nuclear power plants, the State 
has an important role to play. Included in Thomas’ observations of the different countries is 
the level of state support, financial or otherwise, that is provided to the nuclear power industry.  
Taking these roles as a basis, Thomas provides a summary of the ‘institutional structure 
of nuclear power’, as shown in Table 17 (Thomas, 1988, p. 16). 
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 USA FR Germany France Canada 
Vendors # 3/4 1/2 1 1 
Origins Long-standing, diversified 
Long-standing, 
diversified 
Specifically 
created 
Specifically 
created 
Source of 
Technology Indigenous Imported Imported Indigenous 
Manufacturing 
capability 
Increasingly 
sub-contracted Sub-contracted In-house Sub-contracted 
State support None direct None direct Underwritten by government 
Owned by 
government 
Architect-
engineers 
Specialist 
companies Vendor Utility Utility 
Constructors Specialist companies 
Specialist 
companies 
Specialist 
companies Utility 
Utilities         
Number Over 50 ~10 1 3 
Size Wide range Medium/Large Very large Large 
Ownership Generally investor-owned Investor-owned Publicly-owned Publicly-owned 
Catchment area Variable Generally regional National Provincial 
Safety 
regulation         
Utility relations Arm's length Arm's length Close, co-operative 
Close, co-
operative 
Public 
disclosure Very extensive Extensive Limited Extensive 
Methods  Active Active Reactive Reactive 
Centralisation Partially devolved Devolved Centralised Centralised 
Table 17: National nuclear industry structures (Thomas, 1988, p. 16) 
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While not representing polar-opposite approaches to industry structure, it is useful to 
compare the USA and France as relative extremes, due at least in part to the different cultures 
of the two countries. With its preference for private sector competition, the US has maintained 
multiple reactor vendors who compete for each new build project individually. While 
historically these vendors had ‘the capability to supply the major nuclear components’, there 
is now a trend of procuring more components from specialist suppliers (Thomas, 1988, pp. 63-
65). The lack of support from the government and decline in new orders has made it 
uneconomical for the vendors to keep such capability in-house. On the other hand, in France 
the single reactor vendor Areva has benefitted not only from the stability of a national nuclear 
build programme, producing 58 reactors, but also from the State’s ambition to be an 
independent nuclear nation. Thus Areva has been able to maintain much more of its 
manufacturing capability. 
The role of the architect-engineer has also been played out differently in the two 
countries. In the US it has been taken on by companies that often have experience of other 
construction sectors, offering expertise in project management that technology vendors do not 
have. The downside of this separate role is that it may ‘make the logistics of constructing 
nuclear power stations more complex’, ‘by lengthening the lines of communication’ (Thomas, 
1988, p. 67). Moreover, the slowdown in new build projects has seen the loss of nuclear-
specific knowledge from architect-engineer firms. In contrast, France has only one architect-
engineer, which is also the only nuclear utility: EDF. Again, this can be attributed to the 
differences in culture between the two countries, and in particular France’s state-driven 
national programme. Where the US and France do have common ground is the role of the 
constructors: in both countries local contractors have been charged with the construction of the 
nuclear plants.  
While no details are provided, it can nevertheless be envisaged from the above 
descriptions that the supply network structure employed by vendors in the USA is more 
extensive than that of France. Indeed, Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the idealised structures of 
the NPP supply chains in the US and France, as described by Thomas.   
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Figure 25: Idealised Map of Supply Chain Structure in US 
 
 
Figure 26: Idealised Map of Supply Chain Structure in France 
One can draw comparisons between these two case studies and the organisational 
structures of the nuclear industries in the other major nuclear countries. China and Korea have 
followed France’s example by establishing national build programmes, but with differences 
comparable to the US; China has two nuclear utilities as opposed to one, and Korea is more 
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engaged with outside suppliers, though they are tightly integrated with the programme lead 
KEPCO. In Russia, the state-owned vendor represents one extreme by being completely 
vertically integrated.   
3.4.2. Global Reactor Vendors 
The NEA explains that in the past, ‘the design and construction of NPPs was led by 
consortia in each country’ (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2015, p. 160). The largely self-contained 
industry structures described by Thomas (1988) were born out of the era when nuclear power 
was an issue of national sovereignty, and indeed security. Now however, economic pressures 
have led the number of reactor vendors to fall significantly. Those that remain have reduced 
the scope of their technical capabilities to varying degrees, as shown in Table 18, and instead 
outsource to suppliers all over the world. Table 18 highlights further consolidation in the US 
industry beyond what is discussed by Thomas (1988); namely the reduction in reactor vendors 
from four to two as of 2015.  
 
Vendor Country Reactor Capabilities 
AREVA NP France 
EPR 
Manufacturing capability for reactor 
pressure vessel including the Le Creusot 
forgings facility and nuclear steam supply 
system components. 
ATMEA Front end fuel supply and reprocessing facilities as well as decommissioning. 
KERENA 
ABWR 
Co-operation agreement with Mitsubishi 
HI to develop ATMEA technology. 
Candu 
Energy Canada ACR 1000 
Design and construction of NPPs, supply 
of specialised equipment and plant life 
support. 
GE Hitachi US & Japan 
ESBWR Two subsidiary partnerships offer fuel cycle services. 
ABWR Engineering, procurement and construction management of NPPs. 
China 
National 
Nuclear 
Cooperation 
China CNP-1000 CAP 1400 
Subsidiary companies covering nuclear 
construction, fuel supply and fabrication. 
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Vendor Country Reactor Capabilities 
Doosan (with 
KEPCO) 
South 
Korea 
APR-1000 
APR-1400 
Partnership with KEPCO to supply nuclear 
and turbine components and engineering, 
procurement and construction 
management. 
Mitsubishi 
Heavy 
Industries 
Japan 
APWR Joint venture with AREVA to develop ATMEA. 
ATMEA 
Fuel fabrication. Manufacture of reactor 
pressure vessel and nuclear steam supply 
system components. 
Nuclear 
Power 
Corporation 
of India 
India PHWR-220 PHWR-700 
Reactor pressure vessel and turbogenerator 
manufacture (with Larsen & Toubro). 
Architect engineer and engineering, 
procurement and construction 
management. 
Rosatom Russia VVER   
Toshiba/ 
Westinghouse Japan/US 
ABWR 
AP1000 
Reactor pressure vessel internals; steam 
turbine generators; NPP modular 
construction; fuel fabrication; engineering, 
procurement, and construction 
management. 
Table 18: List of nuclear reactor vendors, adapted from NEA (2015, p. 163) 
Moreover, this list highlights the shift in technological dominance from the United 
States to Asia, where now the majority of vendors are based. The United Kingdom, where civil 
nuclear power generation was first realised, no longer has a native reactor vendor.  
3.4.3. Key Component Suppliers 
The NEA provides succinct descriptions of ‘the main components for an NPP, their 
performance characteristics and manufacturing requirements’, as well as where the main 
suppliers are located (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2015, p. 148). In order to appreciate the global 
fragmentation of the nuclear supply chain, the tables shown in Appendix C indicate the region 
where each supplier is based. The component descriptions and supplier information are taken 
from both the NEA (2015, pp. 148-153)  and Nuclear Energy International (2012, pp. 46-87). 
The list shown in Appendix C is by no means exhaustive, but rather illustrative of the 
limitations in supply of critical components. 
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4. Single Programme Analysis 
Having developed a model to estimate the construction costs of SMRs over the course 
of a production programme, in this chapter the model is employed to investigate the economic 
effect of supply chain configuration on a single production programme. The range of supply 
chain configurations considered is defined by the type of SMR vendor, and the relationships it 
has with its supporting supply chain. A total of 8 configurations are examined, based on three 
vendor types and variations in supplier relationships.   
 Supply Chain Scenarios 
4.1.1. Baseline vendor types 
The baseline vendor types adopted in this study are based on observations of the 
practice and limitations of the nuclear industry, as discussed in Section 3: 
 
1. Integrated Vendor – this is a fully vertically integrated vendor, comparable to 
the Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation, which supplies all the factory 
made components internally; 
2. Design & Make Vendor – this is a reactor vendor which designs and 
manufactures reactor components, comparable to EDF;  
3. Design & Buy Vendor – this is a reactor vendor that has no internal 
manufacturing capability, such that all reactor components and subsystems must 
be procured; this is representative of a new reactor design with no production 
experience. 
4.1.2. Detailed configurations 
The baseline vendor types described above are further differentiated by detailed 
configurations, which are defined by the supplier relationship types assigned to each account. 
The supplier types and the corresponding learning rate are listed in Table 19 – the explanation 
for the net learning rate distributions can be found in Section 3.3.4.  The detailed configurations 
are summarised in Table 20.  
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Supplier Relationship Type Net Learning Rate 
Integrated (specialist) High (μ + σ) 
Integrated (not specialist) Medium (μ) 
Enterprise partner High (μ + σ) 
Multiple Source (simple component) Medium (μ) 
Multiple Source (complex component) Low (μ - σ) 
Single Source (buyer power) Low (μ - σ) 
Single Source (supplier power) None 
Table 19: Supplier type net learning rates 
Scenario Vendor Type 
Reactor Plant 
Equipment 
Turbine Plant 
Equipment 
All Other 
Equipment 
Modules 
SC1 Integrated Integrated (specialist) 
Integrated 
(not specialist) 
Integrated 
(not specialist) 
Integrated 
(not specialist) 
SC2 Design & Make 
Integrated 
(specialist) 
Single 
(supplier power) 
Four Box 
Assignment 
Integrated 
(not specialist) 
SC3 Design & Buy 
Single 
(buyer power) 
Single 
(supplier power) 
Four Box 
Assignment 
Integrated 
(not specialist) 
SC4 Design & Make 
Integrated 
(specialist) 
Single 
(supplier power) 
Four Box 
Assignment 
Single 
(buyer power) 
SC5 Design & Buy 
Single 
(buyer power) 
Single 
(supplier power) 
Four Box 
Assignment 
Single 
(buyer power) 
SC6 Enterprise Enterprise Partner Enterprise Partner 
Four Box 
Assignment 
Enterprise 
Partner 
SC7 Design & Make 
Integrated 
(specialist) 
Single 
(supplier power) 
Four Box 
Assignment 
(reduced 
competition) 
Integrated 
(not specialist) 
SC8 Design & Buy 
Single 
(buyer power) 
Single 
(supplier power) 
Four Box 
Assignment 
(reduced 
competition) 
Integrated 
(not specialist) 
Table 20: Supply Chain Configurations 
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Across all configurations, a number of constraints were applied. By definition for an 
Integrated Vendor, all reactor plant equipment was assigned to integrated (specialist) suppliers, 
while all other accounts were assigned to Integrated (not specialist) suppliers. By definition for 
a Design & Make Vendor, all reactor plant equipment was assigned to integrated (specialist) 
suppliers. For a Design & Buy Vendor, all reactor plant equipment was assigned to single 
(buyer power) suppliers; this was to reflect the judgement that such a vendor would be a major 
customer for a third party reactor component producer, which would afford the vendor some 
buyer power.  
Turbine plant equipment was always assumed to come from a single supplier; the 
turbines and generators used in nuclear power plants have technical requirements that 
differentiate them from those used in other thermal plants; consequently their specification is 
tightly coupled to the reactor design (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2015, pp. 152-153). Under 
normal contracting conditions, the turbine plant equipment was therefore assigned to single 
(supplier power) suppliers; this was to reflect the judgement that a turbine-generator supplier 
would have a broad customer base.  
Beyond these constraints, all other equipment was assigned a supplier relationship type 
by applying a four-box methodology, which is explained in Section 4.1.3. In short, the four-
box methodology reflects the standard procurement decision making process, and thus gives 
credible supplier type assignments based on the supply market conditions. 
From the combination of the three baseline vendor types and the above constraints, 
eight detailed configurations were devised as credible supply chain structures to be considered. 
SC1, SC2, and SC3 are considered the benchmark configurations, as each represents one of the 
baseline vendor types. Each of these three assume that module production is done in-house by 
the SMR vendor. SMR vendors would likely have the motivation for this decision, given the 
importance of their delivery (both in terms of time and quality) to the achievement of the 
intended build schedule. However, the vendors may not have the skills and knowledge to 
design and make modules efficiently. Variations in the module supplier type are thus one of 
the supply chain decisions examined in this analysis.  
The subsequent configurations are then used to explore specific supply chain decisions 
that could credibly be considered. SC4 and SC5 have the modules produced by a single external 
supplier. SC6 replaces single contractual suppliers with enterprise partners. SC7 and SC8 
reduce the competition between multiple suppliers compared to the benchmark scenarios; while 
SC2 and SC3 assume four suppliers wherever multiple are used, SC7 and SC8 assume only 
 88 
 
two. The relevance of these supply chain configuration decisions is explained during the results 
discussion in Section 4. 
4.1.3. Four-box methodology 
The methodology for assigning supplier relationships types in summarised in Figure 
27, which is an adaptation of the four box model discussed in Section 3.2. Each component 
account was scored on a 1 – 3 scale for two properties:  
1. The risk and quality requirements associated with the component; 
2. The number of suppliers available for the component.  
The first is a proxy for ‘product specificity’, as a measure of the buyer’s requirements 
for the component. The second is a proxy for the ‘process specificity’, predicated on the 
assumption that there is a strong relationship between the two; specifically, for a given product 
demand, a smaller number of suppliers will be able to support the investment in more 
specialised assets than would for generic ones. Consequently, a low number of suppliers 
equates to high process specificity, and vice versa. The choice of these two metrics was driven 
by the availability of data for the nuclear supply chain, and indeed various alternative four box 
methods can be found in the literature. 
The risk and quality requirement scores were based on information from a supply chain 
map produced by the Nuclear Energy Institute (n.d.) for the US, being the largest nuclear 
market in the world.. This document lists the standard components in a nuclear power plant; 
given that this is based on the US operating fleet, it is assumed that this reflects LWR 
technology. Each component is classified as one of the following by its manufacturing and 
quality assurance requirements: 
1. ‘Standard quality products’ – no quality assurance required; 
2. ‘Supplemental quality products’ – specified quality requirements; 
3. ‘Safety-related products’ – a fully quality assurance programme is required 
(Nuclear Energy Institute, n.d., p. 3)   
By comparing the components in the supply chain map with the EEDB accounts, each of the 
former was scored in ascending order of quality and safety requirements: 1 for standard quality, 
2 for supplemental quality, or 3 for safety-related.  
The number of suppliers for each account was based on information from the Nuclear 
News Buyers Guide 2016 (American Nuclear Society, 2016), which contains a directory of 
suppliers organised by the component(s) they supply. A set of benchmark components were 
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selected to determine the score given based on the number of suppliers list; these are shown in 
Table 21 and Table 22. The benchmark components were selected to cover the range of 
component specificities: fuel elements are highly specialised components, both in their design 
and fabrication processes, and are tightly regulated; switchboards on the other hand can be 
taken as relatively standard electrical components. The scoring system shown in Table 22 was 
employed to create simple, unambiguous groupings of the components. 
 
Buyers Guide Component Number of Suppliers 
Fuel Elements, Fabricated 4 
Turbine-Generators 13 
Switchboards 14 
Fuel Storage Racks 26 
Table 21: Benchmark components (American Nuclear Society, 2016) 
 
Number of Suppliers Score 
n < 10 Low 
10 <= n < 20 Medium 
20 <= n High 
Table 22: Scoring for Number of Suppliers 
Where a direct match between an account and supply chain component was not 
available, a similar account was used based on the type of reactor system or function in which 
it is used. However if no comparable alternative was identified, then the score for ‘Number of 
Suppliers’ was assumed based on the ‘Risk & Quality Requirements score’, In the absence of 
supply chain data, a high score for Risk & Quality Requirements was assumed to equate to a 
low number of suppliers, and vice versa. This is built on the judgement that high quality 
components are more likely to require specialised production assets, and as previously 
discussed this in turn is likely to lead to a smaller pool of suppliers. There is a degree of support 
for this trend in the available data, as shown by Figure 28. This four box diagram maps the 
distribution of components for which independent scores were assessed. The majority of 
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components with a high score for Risk & Quality Requirements have a low score for Number 
of Suppliers, with a minor tendency for a greater number of suppliers for low risk components. 
Appendix B contains the scores for each individual account, as well as the details of which 
accounts were taken as proxies, and which were assumed to follow the discussed trend. 
 
 
Figure 27: Four-box supplier relationship type assignments 
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Figure 28: Distribution of four box scores 
 SMR Programme Parameters 
Beyond the defined supply chain scenarios, a number of reactor and programme 
parameters were selected to explore the importance of supply chain variations under different 
programme conditions: 
1. Reactor power;  
2. Programme size;  
3. Production rate; 
4. Number of module shops; 
5. Interest rate. 
Reactor unit power is relevant because the combination of cost scaling, scope for 
modularisation and production volume has a significant impact on cost distributions within the 
supply chain.  
Programme size and number of module shops both determine the production volume 
throughout the supply chain, which has a bearing on the learning cost reduction achieved. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, production rate is a key determinant of the learning rate achieved in 
production.  
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Finally, while not having a direct relation to configuration of the logistical supply chain, 
the interest rate does have multiple indirect connections. Firstly, the interest rate demanded by 
investors and creditors is indicative of the perceived risk in the delivery of the plant. An 
established supply chain, with consistent constructors and proven performance of delivering a 
standardised design, could arguably attract cheaper capital than is typical for nuclear plant 
projects. Secondly, the extent of government involvement would affect the interest rate. 
Thirdly, the high capital cost of nuclear power plants means that their economics are very 
dependent on the cost of borrowing.  
The interest rates chosen are close to those employed by the International Energy 
Agency and Nuclear Energy Agency in their electricity generating cost analysis (International 
Energy Agency, 2015): 3% represents the ‘social cost of capital’ available to governments; 7% 
is reflective of the market rate in a competitive sector; and 9.6% is the return demanded for 
high risk projects (International Energy Agency, 2015, p. 27). The chosen values for the other 
parameters are shown in Table 23. 
 
Parameter Values 
Reactor Power (MW) 100, 250, 500 
Supply Chain Scenarios 1 – 8 (see Table 20) 
Programme Size (GW) 5, 10, 25 
Production Rate (units/year) 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 25 
Number of Module Shops 1, 2, 4, 8 
Interest Rate (%) 3, 7, 9.6 
Table 23: Programme parameters 
 Results 
In order to condense the results produced from surveying the whole parameter space, 
two metrics were defined: the parity unit and the final TCC. The parity unit is the unit in the 
production run that has achieved sufficient learning cost reduction to reach the benchmark 
LCOE for nuclear power. The benchmark used was $112/MWh, being the bottom of the range 
for large reactors, provided by Lazard (2017). Thus it is indicative of being cost competitive 
with conventional nuclear plants. The final TCC is the total capital cost of the final SMR unit 
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in the production run. This is indicative of the potential for being competitive with other low-
carbon sources of electricity. 
4.3.1. Benchmark configurations 
Figure 29, Figure 30, and Figure 31 show the progressive reduction in TCC of a 250 
MW SMR for three different programme sizes and the three benchmark supply chain 
configurations, in all cases over 10 years and at a 9.6% interest rate. The parity TCC line 
indicates the TCC required for the SMR to achieve the benchmark LCOE of $112/MWh, 
meaning that the parity unit is the unit number at which the TCC curve crosses this line. The 
parity unit and final TCC for each of the nine scenarios are shown in Table 24.  
The most prominent feature of these results is the dominant influence of production 
volume and rate. For all three supply chain configurations, the 5 GW programmes do not 
achieve enough learning cost reduction to be competitive with large nuclear power. For the 
larger programmes, there is a significant range in the length of production required to become 
competitive, and this is also reflected in the range of final TCC values achieved. From these 
results, it can also be understood that while the final TCC metric serves as a measure of the 
long-term benefits achieved by certain programme conditions and supply chain design, the 
parity unit is a measure of the short-term benefits. 
It is also clear from the figures that the supply chain configuration has a major effect 
on the learning cost reduction that is achieved. In all cases, the Integrated Vendor achieved the 
greatest reduction, while the Design & Buy Vendor achieved the least; the final unit TCC for 
the former reduced beyond that of the latter by approximately 6.9% for the 5 GW programme, 
13.2% for the 10 GW programme, and 20.9% for the 25GW programme. The strength of the 
Integrated Vendor shows the benefits of concentrating production volume and rate, as well as 
reducing the cost of interfaces between suppliers; the weakness of the Design & Buy Vendor 
highlights the significance of the reactor plant equipment, which makes up approximately 55% 
of the factory made components.  
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Figure 29: TCC learning curves for SC1 
 
Figure 30: TCC learning curves for SC2 
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Figure 31: TCC learning curves for SC3 
Supply Chain 
Configuration 
Programme 
Size (GW) Parity Unit 
Final TCC 
($/kW) 
SC1 
5 - 6,819 
10 10 5,906 
25 5 4,801 
SC2 
5 - 7,103 
10 23 6,437 
25 8 5,615 
SC3 
5 - 7,323 
10 - 6,802 
25 20 6,071 
Table 24: Benchmark configuration metrics 
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4.3.2. Production rate and volume 
To further explore the importance of production consolidation, the three benchmark 
configurations were evaluated across the full ranges of programme size, production rate, and 
module shop number. Figure 32 through Figure 37 show the resulting parity unit and final unit 
TCC values.  
The parity unit plots highlight the importance of production rate, regardless of the 
programme size. Figure 32 emphasises the short run advantage yielded from high learning 
rates: SC1 achieves single digit parity unit values, so long as the number of module shops is 
kept low. In contrast Figure 36 has very few data points at all, only those with large 
programmes and production rates, thus showing the particularly limited scope the Design & 
Buy Vendor has for cost competitiveness. This is also reflected in the almost uniformly high 
final TCC values shown Figure 37. 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Parity unit plot for 250MW SMR, SC1, 9.6% IRR 
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Figure 33: Final unit TCC plot for 250MW SMR, SC1, 9.6% IRR 
 
Figure 34: Parity unit plot for 250MW SMR, SC2, 9.6% IRR 
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Figure 35: Final unit TCC plot for 250MW SMR, SC2, 9.6% IRR 
 
Figure 36: Parity unit plot for 250MW SMR, SC3, 9.6% IRR 
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Figure 37: Final unit TCC plot for 250MW SMR, SC3, 9.6% IRR 
4.3.3. Single suppliers and enterprise partners 
An important lesson from the experience of other industries is the importance of the 
relationships between vendors and their single-source suppliers. Configurations SC4 and SC5 
show the effect of outsourcing the module manufacturing to a single supplier, using traditional 
contracting arrangements. The increased interface costs and value capture by the supplier cause 
a discernible reduction in learning, as shown in Figure 38. For both the Design & Buy and 
Design & Make Vendors, the final unit TCC is increased by nearly 4% due to this procurement 
variation. However, if all the traditional single source suppliers are replaced with enterprise 
partners as in SC6, the resultant increase in learning makes such a market-based supply chain 
competitive with the fully integrated vendor case. 
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Figure 38: Single supplier relationship effect on learning 
4.3.4. Reduced competition 
In the case of components for which multiple suppliers have been chosen, the 
benchmark configurations assume that 4 suppliers are used, with production volume and rate 
distributed evenly across them. SC7 and SC8 consider the effect of consolidating this supply 
base to just 2 suppliers for each, in pursuit of a balance of benefits between production 
concentration and competition. Figure 39 shows that this configuration variation actually has a 
minimal impact on learning cost reduction. This can be explained by the fact that the total value 
of the components assigned to multiple suppliers is already a small share to begin with; the 
factory and module shop costs are instead dominated by single source components.  
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Figure 39: Consolidated competition effect on learning 
4.3.5. Reactor power and interest rate 
Alongside the supply chain configuration parameters, the effect of reactor power with 
variants of 100 and 500 MW and interest rates over the range 3-10% were also analysed. 
Variations in the latter have a predictable and consistent influence: a higher interest rate raises 
the cost (TCC) of all production units. However, variations in reactor power put competing 
pressures on cost. When reactor power is increased, economies of scale reduce the capital costs. 
At the same time the scope for modularisation, and in turn schedule reduction, is also reduced 
(as examined in detail by Lloyd (2019)). Furthermore the reduced number of units produced, 
and perhaps more importantly the lower production rate required to achieve a fixed programme 
capacity, both reduce learning rates. Increasing reactor size from 250 MW decreases the effect 
of all of these cost reduction measures.  
The net result of these effects is shown in Figure 40, Figure 41, and Figure 42 for each 
of the benchmark supply chain configurations; each figure shows a quadratic polynomial 
surface fitted to the 9 evaluated data points. With each supply chain configuration, the 250 MW 
SMR achieves lower final unit TCCs than both the 100 MW and 500 MW SMRs; for the 
former, this is because the scaling effect overwhelms the cost reduction efforts; for the latter, 
the benefits of scale are undone by the reduced learning potential. However, for SC2 and SC3 
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the balance of these effects across the reactor power range is different; with these 
configurations achieving less learning cost reduction, economies of scale becomes more 
important. Consequently the cost advantage of the 250 MW unit size over 100 MW is 
increased, while that over the 500 MW is decreased. At the same time, variations in interest 
rate have a greater effect for larger units, due to their longer build schedules.  
 
Figure 40: Effect of interest rate and reactor size variations (SC1, 25GW 10 year programme) 
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Figure 41: Effect of interest rate and reactor size variations (SC2, 25GW 10 year programme) 
 
Figure 42: Effect of interest rate and reactor size variations (SC3, 25GW 10 year programme) 
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 Summary of performance 
Table 25 summarises the performance of the 8 supply chain configurations. It makes 
clear that in order to achieve competitiveness against large nuclear power, an SMR programme 
must produce at least 10 GW. Moreover, with the best performing configuration and 
programme conditions combinations highlighted in green, the importance of supplier 
relationships is emphasised. For markets where a fully integrated SMR vendor would not be 
possible, strategic partnerships between a vendor and key component suppliers can make for a 
competitive supply chain; such a collaborative enterprise could achieve sufficient innovation 
and keep interface costs down in order to achieve high learning cost reduction. Both a 
collaborative enterprise and an integrated vendor can achieve LCOE parity with large nuclear 
after ~1.25 GW (equivalent to one large reactor), and after a 10 year 25 GW production run, 
bring Total Capital Cost below $5,000/kW. Moreover, with a high learning supply chain 
configuration, a SMR size in the region of 250 MW is best; this strikes the balance between 
economies of scale and scope for modularisation, which enables learning. 
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Configuration 10 Year Programme Size (GW) Parity Unit Final TCC ($/kW) 
SC1 
5 - 6,819 
10 10 5,906 
25 5 4,801 
SC2 
5 - 7,103 
10 23 6,437 
25 8 5,615 
SC3 
5 - 7,323 
10 - 6,802 
25 20 6,071 
SC4 
5 - 7,199 
10 38 6,603 
25 12 5,839 
SC5 
5 - 7,419 
10 - 6,968 
25 34 6,295 
SC6 
5 - 6,801 
10 9 5,913 
25 5 4,881 
SC7 
5 - 7,100 
10 22 6,410 
25 8 5,583 
SC8 
5 - 7,320 
10 -  6,775 
25 18 6,039 
Table 25: Summary of supply chain configuration performance 
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5. Global Programme Analysis 
Having established that a programme size of 10 GW over 10 years is required to make 
SMRs cost competitive with current large nuclear power, consideration must be given to 
whether such demand is likely to exist, and how practical supply chain design might constrain 
access to it. The specific factors to be investigated can be grouped into two categories:  
1. Country conditions; 
2. Logistics and localisation.  
While the preceding analysis has assumed competitive markets based on the scale and 
the economics of the United States and similar Western states, other less developed countries 
will offer different market conditions. Because of the large labour content of nuclear 
construction the variations in labour rates will have a significant bearing on construction costs. 
Also, differences in the cost of capital, due to varying extents of government support or 
participation, will also play a role.  
In terms of logistics and localisation, not only could physical transport constraints limit 
global supply, but the need to adopt local supply, local design and local safety standards in 
exchange for market access will likely also need to be considered. 
The analysis in this chapter has the following structure: firstly, credible scenarios for 
aggregate global SMR demand are defined, which are then used to determine how many global 
SMR programmes, or supply chains could be supported. The aforementioned constraints are 
then factored in to define segmented market scenarios, which are then assessed for their 
potential to deliver cost competitive SMRs. 
 Aggregate Global Demand Scenarios 
In this study, it is assumed that the key differentiator between SMRs and conventional 
large LWRs is their economics. Consequently, while other studies have used bottom-up 
analysis of the total available market and the economics of nuclear versus other sources of 
electricity to arrive at specific market sizes for SMRs, in this analysis the demand for SMRs is 
based on that of conventional nuclear power. Moreover, while similar market studies can be 
found in the literature for nuclear power more broadly, in this study the view is taken that the 
overriding driver behind demand for nuclear power is policy: the deployment of nuclear power 
is particularly sensitive to political and public support or opposition.  
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Consequently, the demand projections adopted in this study are taken from the World 
Energy Outlook 2015 produced by the International Energy Agency (2015). The specific data 
used is based on the report’s central scenario, the New Policies Scenario, which reflects energy 
market ‘policies and implementing measures…adopted as of mid-2015…together with 
relevant declared policy intentions’ (International Energy Agency, 2015, p. 31). It provides 
global gross electricity generating capacity additions, segmented by region and certain states, 
for the periods 2015 – 2025 and 2026 – 2040; the values for the latter period are used. To 
provide a range of possible aggregate demand, the WEO 2015 data is taken as a conservative 
estimate, and paired with the ambitious Harmony goal promoted by the World Nuclear 
Association (2018).  This sets the target for nuclear power to deliver 25% of global electricity 
by 2050, and projects that this would require a build rate of 33GW/year of installed capacity in 
the period 2026-2050. The two aggregate projections are married by converting them both to 
10 year demand for capacity addition. To arrive at SMR specific demand values, these nuclear 
demand projections are overlaid with low, medium, and high market share projections for 
SMRs. The resulting six aggregate SMR demand scenarios are shown in Table 26. 
 
  
10 Year Global Nuclear New Build  
(2020s - 2030s) 
  
Low Demand (145 GW) 
IEA WEO 2015 
High Demand (330 
GW) 
WNA Harmony Goal 
SMR  
Market Share 
Low (20%) 29 GW 66 GW 
Medium (50%) 72.5 GW 165 GW 
High (80%) 116 GW 264 GW 
Table 26: Aggregate global SMR demand scenarios 
5.1.1. LCOE benchmark 
Construction and operating costs for nuclear power plants unsurprisingly vary globally, 
which gives a wide range of resultant LCOE values. Therefore a competitive LCOE band was 
identified in lieu of a single benchmark figure as used in the single programme analysis. Table 
27 shows the reference LCOEs used in the IEA’s development of their global capacity addition 
estimates (International Energy Agency, 2015). Based on the accompanying statistics, the 
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competitive LCOE band was set as $80/MWh - $100/MWh (assuming a 7% interest rate). The 
disparity in global LCOEs for nuclear can be attributed both to variations in local labour costs 
and different programme conditions: China in particular has benefited from recent build 
experience, enabling the supply chain, constructors, and programme managers to apply 
learning to bring down cost; Western countries on the other hand has had little new build plants, 
with a lack of standardisation and regulatory intervention driving up cost (Energy Technologies 
Institute, 2018, p. 21). 
 
Nuclear Plant  
Location 
Nuclear Plant LCOE 
(2017 $/MWh) 
Belgium 88.76 
Finland 81.87 
France 87.14 
Hungary 94.84 
Japan 92.34 
Korea 42.62 
Slovak Republic 88.52 
UK 106.24 
USA 81.94 
China (Plant 1) 50.20 
China (Plant 2) 39.26 
Mean 77.61 
Standard Deviation 22.70 
Table 27: IEA reference nuclear LCOE values, inflated to 2017 dollars (International Energy 
Agency, 2015, pp. 48-49) 
5.1.2. SMR programme performance 
Figure 43 shows the cost reduction performance of SMR programmes against the 
largest and smallest aggregate demand scenarios given in Table 26. A Design & Make Vendor 
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(SC2) was assumed, being the median learning performer of the three baseline configurations, 
and a 7% interest rate was applied. The potential for multiple SMR vendors was considered, 
with the results for a maximum of 8 vendors shown.  
In the extremely optimistic scenario of a high demand for nuclear power, in line with 
the Harmony goal, and a dominating preference for SMRs over large reactors, SMRs would 
quickly become competitive power generators. In the extreme case of one vendor and supply 
chain delivering against all global demand, the SMRs produced could compete with the 
cheapest large reactors; this is assuming US-based costs in the SMR programme, which have 
to compete with cheaper labour abroad. Perhaps more importantly however, in the extreme 
high demand scenario, the volume could be split amongst up to 8 vendors, and significant cost 
reduction would still be realised, bringing the SMR LCOE to the bottom of the benchmark 
range. On the other hand, in the extreme low demand scenario, dividing the volume between 8 
vendors dilutes the potential for learning, such that little cost reduction is realised. However if 
production is concentrated in one vendor, sufficient volume would be produced to bring the 
SMR LCOE down again to the bottom of the benchmark range.   
Overall when considered in aggregate, one can conclude that there will be sufficient 
global demand to support multiple competitive SMR programmes between the 2020s and 
2030s. However, if SMRs are to deliver significant cost improvement over conventional 
nuclear power plants, and thus compete with other technologies, except in the most optimistic 
scenarios production should be consolidated amongst a small pool of vendors. 
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Figure 43: Bounding cases of 250MW SMR programme performance against aggregate global 
demand 
5.1.3. Role of reactor power 
As previously discussed, variations in reactor power change the balance between 
scaling and the cost reduction methods applied to SMRs. Figure 44 and Figure 45 show the 
same bounding cases of aggregate demand for 500 MW and 100 MW SMR programmes 
respectively.  
These results indicate that the scaling effect for 100 MW plants is such that they would 
struggle to be cost competitive even with in the extremely high volume scenarios. Moreover, 
the results suggest that while having a cost advantage in the short run, with a modest volume 
the 500 MW plants are only slightly more competitive than 250 MW plants in the long-run, but 
only for the case of a single reactor vendor supplying the whole  (260 GW) market. It should 
be highlighted that these results are for a 7% interest rate and a Design & Make Vendor; both 
higher interest rates and a supply chain configuration delivering better learning performance 
both tilt the balance more in favour of the 250 MW plant. 
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Figure 44: Bounding cases of 500MW SMR programme performance against aggregate global 
demand 
 
Figure 45: Bounding cases of 100MW SMR programme performance against aggregate global 
demand 
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 Segmented Market Scenarios 
While the analysis in the preceding section indicates that sufficient global demand 
exists to support multiple SMR programmes, considering this demand in aggregate is 
misleading. The ability of a single vendor and supply chain to deliver SMRs to the whole global 
market is likely to be constrained by: 
 
• Market access – given the geopolitical nature of nuclear technology, certain 
national markets may be closed completely to foreign vendors, or to certain 
nationalities based on strategic partnering and rivalry; 
• Technical and safety standards – a lack of regulatory harmonisation between 
markets creates barriers to entry;  
• Localisation – often related to market access, the desire for local economic 
benefit from the significant investment required for a nuclear power plant leads 
to demands for local component supply; 
• Logistics – physical transport constraints can similarly necessitate localisation 
of manufacturing. 
 
Harmonisation of technical and safety standards can be singled out as potential barriers 
to both standardisation and production learning. Current methods in the nuclear industry 
employ technical standards which vary from country to country. For example a reactor design 
of US origin would have its component and construction drawings in US imperial units, 
whereas UK construction uses SI metric units. Therefore all such drawings would need to be 
converted.  
Safety regulators around the world have regulatory systems that operate to the same 
IAEA safety principles. However, the way in which these operate are different, reflecting 
different legal histories and industry experience. The clearest example of this difference is 
between the US and UK regulatory approaches: the former’s Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
employs prescriptive technical standards, while the latter’s Office for Nuclear Regulation sets 
overall safety goals. While these two systems have the same purpose and principles as their 
basis,  the different processes lead to different requirements and potentially different designs. 
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Unless there is substantial progress in harmonisation of both technical standards and 
safety regulation, if not across the whole world then at least in key markets, the economic 
potential of SMRs will be impaired. 
To generate segmented market scenarios, the following constraints are applied to the 
more conservative global demand estimates taken from the IEA’s WEO 2015: 
 
1. Due to the existing nuclear industries and size of their domestic demand, the 
US, China, and Russia are considered base markets that are closed to each other; 
if sufficient demand exists each will have their own SMR programme(s); 
2. Based on past nuclear exports (World Nuclear Association, 2019), each of the 
base markets is assignment possible export markets, shown in Table 28; 
3. As a logistics and localisation constraint, each major region must have a 
dedicated module manufacturing facility; the asterisks in Table 28 indicate 
markets requiring their own such facility. 
 
Base Market Potential Export Markets 
US Americas, Europe* 
China Asia, Europe*, Middle East* 
Russia Eastern Europe/Eurasia, Asia*, Middle East* 
Table 28: Export market assignments 
Table 29 shows the estimated SMR market sizes for each of the segmented markets. 
While each of the base markets has the potential to support a single programme, there is 
sufficient potential demand to incentivise export (~20 GW for the USA, ~39 GW for China, 
and ~27 GW for Russia). In order to adjust the SMR capital costs to evaluate SMR programmes 
in these different markets, the labour rate factors shown in Table 30 are applied. They are 
derived from the ratio of average salaries (Parent, 2008) for the manufacturing and construction 
industries. For broad regions, the countries in brackets are the source of the relevant salary 
data. This approach is similar to that employed by MIT (2018) and the ETI (2018) in their own 
analysis. 
The final set of constraints applied to the different market scenarios relate to supply 
chain configuration and interest rates. Based on the differences in the existing nuclear 
 114 
 
industries in the different countries, for Chinese and Russian SMR programmes, Integrated 
Vendors are assumed (SC1); this reflects the existence of their state-owned reactor vendors. 
Similarly, as SMR vendors in these countries would likely have access to government finance, 
a 3% interest rate is assumed. For US SMR programmes, a Design & Make Vendor is assumed, 
due to the presence of multiple established reactor vendors; a 7% interest rate is employed to 
reflect the need for private finance, tempered with some assumed government support. 
 
State 
10 Year 
Nuclear Capacity Additions 
(GW) 
(International Energy Agency, 
2015) 
Market Size (GW) 
(with 80% share) 
USA 16.7 13.3 
China 39.3 31.5 
Russia 14.7 11.7 
Americas 
(w/o USA) 
1.3 1.1 
Asia 
(w/o China) 
19.3 15.5 
Eastern Europe/Eurasia 
(w/o Russia) 
8.7 6.9 
Europe 23.3 18.7 
Middle East 6.0 4.8 
Table 29: Segmented market sizes 
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State 
Module Shop Labour 
(Manufacturing) 
Site Labour 
(Construction) 
US 1.00 1.00 
China 0.05 0.04 
Russia 0.10 0.20 
Europe (France) 0.55 0.43 
Asia (Philippines) 0.07 0.05 
Middle East (Kuwait/Israel) 0.35 0.42 
Eastern Europe/Eurasia (Romania) 0.08 0.07 
Table 30: Labour rate factors 
The net effect of these constraints is illustrated in Figure 46, which shows the 
progressive reduction in LCOE of SMRs produced in four independent programmes: domestic 
programmes in the US and China, and mutually exclusive export programmes in Europe by a 
single US and single Chinese vendor. The large differences in first unit costs between each 
vendor’s domestic and export programmes reflects the significance of labour cost variations 
between the countries. Moreover, the difference between the two European programmes is 
largely attributable to the different costs of capital available to the two vendors; the vendor type 
and consequent learning rate differences are reflected in the minor gradient differences. 
The independent treatment of these four programmes has two implications related to 
learning. Firstly, the production volumes of factory made components would in reality be 
consolidated, either in part or completely; the former is more likely due to the aforementioned 
pressures for localisation of supply to acquire market access. Nevertheless, given that factory 
equipment makes the dominant contribution to learning cost reduction, any degree of 
consolidation would give significant benefit. Secondly, the possibility of technology and 
knowledge transfer means that export programmes need not start at the top of their learning 
curves. Technology transfer models, such as that employed by Haug (1992), suggest that a 
proportion of learning benefits can be credited to a new production facility; this reflects the 
benefits of replicating existing facility designs and tooling in new locations. In fact this process 
could be used to justify pursuing export in advance of a domestic programme; initial learning 
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could be done with production in markets with cheaper labour, allowing the subsequent 
domestic programme to start some way down the learning curve. 
Conversely, the model’s assumptions regarding standardisation and modularisation are 
open to challenge when considering global demand. If export markets require design changes 
to reflect their particular technical standards or other regulatory requirements, costs will not 
only be incurred in making the changes themselves, but also in the effective loss of learning if 
manufacturing and build processes are affected. Similarly, the modularisation scheme 
investigated by Lloyd (2019), which is implied in the modularisation percentages in the cost 
model, is based on road transport envelopes; it is therefore assumed that modules can be easily 
transported from module facilities to plant sites, irrespective of where they are located. The 
same rationale is assumed for factory made components, meaning that transport costs are 
assumed to be negligible. However, if component and module transport is more constrained, 
not only would these costs need to be factored into supplier and module shop location selection, 
but also market access. Thus all the cost reduction principles pursued by SMRs – 
standardisation, modularisation, and learning – are relevant considerations when planning a 
global SMR production programme. 
 
 
Figure 46: Comparison of US and China SMR programmes 
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 Key Findings 
Projections of aggregate global demand for nuclear power, based on current national 
policies, suggest that multiple SMR supply chains could be supported. If SMRs are only able 
to take a small share of the market, 1 or 2 SMR programmes could still bring costs down to a 
competitive level. However, if more ambitious nuclear capacity additions are pursued, multiple 
SMR supply chains could serve the expected demand. In reality though, nearly half of nuclear 
new build will be within the closed markets of the US, Russia, and China, where only domestic 
SMR programmes would have a presence.  
Under the conservative demand estimates, each of these countries could support a single 
competitive SMR programme, with significant export opportunity available. Furthermore, 
variations in labour rates could make export programmes cheaper (particularly for a US 
vendor), such that experience could be gained to enable learning benefits before the start of a 
domestic programme. However, this is dependent on the harmonisation of technical standards 
and regulation such that standardised designs can be deployed globally, and development of 
easily transportable modules. 
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6. Programme Costs 
The costs of individual SMR plants from the first-of–a-series to the nth production unit 
within a possible SMR production programme have been examined in detail. The costs of 
establishing such a programme and how they could be recovered must also be considered. 
These one-off costs incurred by the SMR vendor or consortium would have to be recovered 
over the course of the production programme. The vendor would therefore need to be confident 
that a sufficient volume of units would be produced, and an appropriate design fee recovered 
on each, to justify the upfront investment. 
The analysis in this section takes the following steps: firstly, the structure of a possible 
project to develop an SMR production programme is described; secondly, credible costs are 
posited for such a project; thirdly, the aggregate investment costs and accrued interest at the 
start of production are compared with the net present value of design fees charged throughout 
the programme. This allows a determination to be made as to the required production volume 
and design fee to make a programme economically viable. 
 Development Project Structure  
Both the project structure and associated costs for the development of a SMR 
programme are based on data presented in a discussion of nuclear technology development 
projects from MIT (2018). This report has as its focus an advanced reactor with new technology 
that has not been demonstrated or built at scale. It provides a structure for new reactor 
development and deployment and a transparent set of up-to-date costs. The use of this data for 
the somewhat different case of a light-water based SMR needs to be considered in this context; 
the reactor technology would not be new, but the design and production process would be. 
As the report explains, the steps required to bring a new reactor to market include 
‘R&D, full detailed engineering design work, development of fuel and provisions for fuel 
disposition, construction and testing of a prototype, and licensing’ (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2018, p. 106). Figure 47 shows a summary of such a development project for both 
a higher and lower maturity technology; the costs are based on detailed studies produced by 
the US Department of Energy and associated national laboratories (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2018, p. 107).  
The three stages of technology development as described in the report are: 
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1. Early development – research and development, design development, and 
readying of the supply chain; 
2. Performance demonstration – proving of the technology; 
3. Commercial demonstration – proving the commercial viability. 
 
One of the key assumptions bounding the scope of this thesis is that an SMR design 
would be based on light water reactor technology which can be considered highly mature 
technology, with an established fuel cycle and many thousands of reactor years of operational 
experience. Consequently, a SMR should not require a reactor performance demonstrator, such 
that a development project could proceed directly from the early development stage to a 
commercial demonstrator. This commercial demonstrator would fulfil the role of the LEAD 
plant as described by Rosner & Goldberg (2011), which ‘likely would be custom-built, but 
based on the design that ultimately would be built in a factory’ (Rosner & Goldberg, 2011, p. 
17). This would facilitate the testing and refinement of the modules and on-site assembly 
process. A final step beyond the plan laid out in Figure 47 would be the construction of the 
module manufacturing facility, once confidence in the build process had been reached. 
 
 
 
Figure 47: Development Project Summary (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018, p. 107) 
[Republished with permission of MIT] 
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 Development Project Costs 
A summary of the development stages for an SMR programme and associated costs is 
shown in Table 31, and as is based on the higher maturity technology project described by MIT 
(2018). However, as discussed at length in the previous sections, the construction methodology 
for an SMR is intended to be significantly different from past practice. Moreover the desire to 
achieve standardisation, schedule reduction, and ultimately cost savings necessitates upfront 
design and development of the build process. Therefore the costs associated with the lower 
maturity technology in the MIT report were taken for R&D, design development, and the 
supply chain. The costs for design completion and licensing, as well as for the operational 
testing of the commercial demonstrator, were taken from the higher maturity technology plan. 
The aggregate $1 billion cost for developing and licensing the design seems reasonable; the 
same cost is cited for R&D and design of a HTGR reactor (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2018, p. 106), as well as for the detailed design and engineering for an LWR SMR 
(Rosner & Goldberg, 2011, p. 18). 
The construction cost of the commercial demonstrator was determined by applying the 
same 50% increase to the first production unit OCC as done in the MIT report. For a 250MW 
SMR, the first unit specific OCC of $5,878/kW equates to approximately $1.47 billion; this 
gives an OCC for a commercial demonstrator of approximately $2.2 billion. The extra 
construction cost for the demonstrator ($735 million) reflects the need to refine the build 
process, and accounts for other first-of-a-kind costs. Finally, Rosner & Goldberg estimate that 
a module manufacturing facility would cost $300 million; as their model was based on a single 
module type being produced in this facility, this cost was increased to $400 million to account 
for the added complexity of manufacturing multiple module types. 
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Project Stage Activity Cost ($ million) Time (years) 
Develop and licence design 
R&D 300 
5 
Design Development 200 
Supply Chain 200 
Design Completion 100 
Licensing 200 
Commercial Demonstrator 
Construction 2,204 
7 
Operational Testing 200 
Module Manufacturing Facility Construction 400 2 
Table 31: SMR Programme Development 
 Programme Setup Cost Recovery 
While the total development cost for an SMR programme is approximately $3.8 billion, 
a significant proportion of this amount would already be recovered in the revenue from sales. 
The cost of the module manufacturing facility is already assumed to be amortised over the 
modules produced, and thus included in the module shop overhead costs (Economic Modeling 
Working Group, 2007, p. 111). The majority of the construction cost of the commercial 
demonstrator can be recovered from the revenues accrued from its electricity sales, just as for 
a production unit. One would expect a somewhat lower initial availability from this 
demonstration plant, reducing the capacity factor, which in turn would require a higher 
electricity price. However, if the additional first-of-a-kind construction costs (approximately 
$735 million) are separated out, the demonstrator’s LCOE could be close to that of the first 
production unit and hence mostly covered by the revenue from electricity sales. 
By removing the module facility cost, and only counting the first-of-a-kind share of the 
demonstrator construction cost, the programme setup costs are reduced to approximately $1.94 
billion. Figure 48 shows the schedule for the development activities; it is assumed that the costs 
are spread uniformly across the relevant periods. If a 7% interest rate is assumed, the total setup 
costs accrued at the end of the development project are approximately $3.17 billion. This is the 
cost that must be recovered by the design fees.   
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Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
R&D, Design Development 
and Supply Chain           
        
Design Completion & 
Licensing 
               
Demonstrator 
Construction 
                  
Demonstrator 
Operational Testing 
                        
Figure 48: Programme Development Schedule 
 In the case of a 10GW, 10 year production programme, resulting in a production rate 
of 4 units per year, a design fee of approximately $113 million would be required. When 
discounting the annual cash flow of these design fees over the 10 year programme using a 7% 
discount rate, the net present value of the cash flows equals the $3.17 billion total setup costs. 
This design fee equates to approximately 7.7% of the OCC of the first production unit.  
The effects of varying the production volume and interest rate on the required design 
fee are shown in Table 32; the percentage of the first SMR unit OCC that the design fees equate 
to are shown in brackets. These results show that a production volume of 10 GW (40 units) or 
more can bring the design fee down to a relatively small (5-10%) increase beyond the capital 
cost of the units themselves. Conversely, high interests and low production volumes results in 
higher design fees, reaching up to nearly 21% of OCC in the case of a 5 GW programme with 
an IRR of 9.6%. 
 
Design Fee  
($ million per unit) 
Interest Rate 
3% 7% 9.6% 
10 Year 
Programme 
Volume 
5 GW 140 (9.5%) 226 (15.4%) 306 (20.8%) 
10 GW 70 (4.8%) 113 (7.7%) 153 (10.4%) 
20 GW 35 (2.4%) 56 (3.8%) 76 (5.2%) 
Table 32: Design fee variation with production volume and interest rate       
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While the lower interest rates are indicative of public financing rather than private costs 
of capital, there are a number of specific steps which state actors could take to reduce the hurdle 
posed by these programme setup costs, such as:  
• providing grants or loans for early development;  
• match funding private investor contributions;  
• providing a physical site for a commercial demonstrator. 
In summary, the total projected development costs of approximately $3.8bn do not 
significantly change the economics of SMR production units, if amortized over a sufficient 
programme volume (10 GW+). However, the total is large enough compared to the balance 
sheets of potential private vendors that it could be a barrier to investment; there is consequently 
a need for a large and relatively certain launch market and/or some level of government support. 
In countries where the initial developments costs are funded or co-funded by the government, 
vendors will have a significant advantage in being able to launch a programme; not because of 
inherent lower costs, but because the risk associated with such a large investment will be 
reduced. 
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7. Uncertainties 
While the results in the preceding sections are based on reasoned assumptions built into 
the cost model, significant uncertainty is present in the parameter values; parameters that in 
some way reflect human performance are particularly uncertain. As it would be impractical to 
consider the uncertainty in every individual parameter in the cost model, the analysis in this 
section focusses on the key areas of cost reduction: standardisation, modularisation, schedule 
reduction, and learning. The effect of uncertainty in these areas was assessed by employing a 
Monte Carlo method. 
 Selected Parameters 
Table 33 presents the parameters selected for uncertainty analysis, with their fixed 
values used in the preceding sections, and the probability distribution applied in the following 
uncertainty analysis. The uncertainty in the standardisation factor reflects the variability in 
possible SMR plant site conditions, which has a bearing on the amount of the plant design that 
has to be customised. The uncertainties in the modularisation cost factors and learning rates 
are due to human performance: directly with regards to labour productivity and learning, and 
indirectly with regards to material cost changes, as this reflects the performance of module and 
build process designers. Similarly, the build time is uncertain due to its dependence on the 
performance of the on-site module assemblers, as well as again on the build process designers. 
In the absence of uncertainty data, symmetric triangular distributions of the form shown 
in Figure 49 were applied. This allowed probability distributions to be formed by using the 
previously assumed value as the most likely value, and making a judgement about either a 
probable lower or upper limiting value. The resulting triangular distribution factors are shown 
in Table 34 and Table 35. 
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Figure 49: Triangular Distribution 
 
Cost Reduction 
Method Parameter 
Fixed Value in the 
Cost Model 
Distribution  
Applied 
Scaling Scaling Factors See Table 35 Triangular 
Standardisation Standardisation Factor 0.2 Triangular 
Modularisation 
Labour 
Productivity Factor 0.3 Triangular 
Structural Material 
Increase Factor 1.05 Triangular 
Non-Structural 
Material Decrease 
Factor 
0.9 Triangular 
Schedule 
Reduction Build Time 51 months Triangular 
Learning Learning Rate 
Based on  
production rate and  
supplier type 
Normal 
Table 33: Parameters selected for uncertainty analysis 
!(#)
#
2& − (
( ) &
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Parameter Lower Limit, a Most Likely, b Upper Limit, c 
Standardisation 
Factor 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Labour Productivity 
Factor 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Structural Material 
Increase Factor 1 1.05 1.1 
Non-Structural 
Material Decrease 
Factor 
0.8 0.9 1 
Build Time (months) 42 51 60 
Table 34: Triangular distribution factors 
Account Lower Limit, a Most Likely, b Upper Limit, c 
Structures & 
Improvements 0.18 0.59 1.0 
Reactor Plant 
Equipment 0.06 0.53 1.0 
Turbine Plant 
Equipment 0.66 0.83 1.0 
Electrical Plant 
Equipment -0.02 0.49 1.0 
Miscellaneous Plant 
Equipment 0.18 0.59 1.0 
Main Condenser and 
Heat Rejection 
System 
1.0 1.06 1.12 
Construction 
Services 0.38 0.69 1.0 
Engineering & 
Home Office 
Services 
0.2 0.60 1.0 
Field Supervision & 
Field Office Services 0.38 0.69 1.0 
Table 35: Scaling factor triangular distribution factors 
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A limit of 90% of an SMR plant being standardised was judged appropriate, equating 
to a lower limit for the standardisation factor of 0.1. With regards to modularisation, an 80% 
cost reduction from increased labour productivity when moving from site to factory conditions 
was judged to be the maximum achievable. The lower limit of the structural material increase 
factor was set at 1, equating to no increase at all; the same rationale gave the upper limit of 1 
for the non-structural material decrease factor. A lower limit on the build time of a 250 MW 
SMR was taken to be 3.5 years. Finally, the relevant upper/lower limit for the scaling factors 
was set to 1.0, meaning no scaling. 
To consider the effect of uncertainty in the achievement of learning cost reduction, the 
cost modelling approach was altered. As before, a normal distribution of learning rates for each 
account was determined from the production rate. The deterministic learning rate determined 
as described in Section 2.6.6 was instead taken as the new mean of the normal distribution, 
with the same standard deviation. The effect of this was that the supplier type shifted the entire 
distribution by a multiple of the standard deviation, rather than selecting a single rate. This 
normal distribution served as the learning rate probability distribution. In each simulation, the 
learning rate was sampled separately for each factory and module shop account.  
 Results 
The results presented in this section were generated by using the fixed parameter values 
shown in Table 36. A high interest rate, production volume and production rate were chosen 
as these conditions would be more sensitive to variations in the selected parameters. Similarly, 
the integrated vendor type was selected as it gave the greatest learning cost reduction in the 
deterministic analysis, and thus would be the most sensitive to variations in the learning rate.  
Figure 52 through Figure 59 are histograms of the resultant output costs from the Monte 
Carlo simulations. For each of the input uncertainties, variations in the final SMR unit TCC 
and LCOE were measured, as well as the parity unit for learning uncertainty; the measured 
TCC values for schedule reduction are not shown, due to the spurious distribution arising from 
the phenomenon explained in Section 2.8.3. Each uncertainty was considered in isolation. 
However the modularisation uncertainty is the aggregate of the three relevant parameters. 
Similarly, the learning uncertainty is the aggregate of separate factory and module shop 
learning uncertainties in each account, and the scaling uncertainty the aggregate of 
uncertainties in each two digit account scaling factor. 
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Parameter Value 
Power 250MW 
Interest Rate 9.6% 
Programme Size 20GW 
Production Rate 8 units per year 
Number of Module Shops 1 
SMR Vendor Type Integrated (SC1) 
Number of Simulations 10,000 
Table 36: Uncertainty analysis fixed parameters 
 
 
 
Figure 50: Final unit TCC distribution due to scaling uncertainty 
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Figure 51: Final unit LCOE distribution due to scaling uncertainty 
 
Figure 52: Final unit TCC distribution due to standardisation uncertainty 
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Figure 53: Final unit LCOE distribution due to standardisation uncertainty 
 
Figure 54: Final unit TCC distribution due to modularisation uncertainty 
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Figure 55: Final unit LCOE distribution due to modularisation uncertainty 
 
Figure 56: Final unit LCOE distribution due to build time uncertainty 
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Figure 57: Final unit TCC distribution due to learning uncertainty 
 
Figure 58: Final unit LCOE distribution due to learning uncertainty 
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Figure 59: Parity unit distribution due to learning uncertainty 
Table 37 shows the statistics for the normal distributions fitted to the uncertainty results, 
while for comparison Table 38 contains the deterministic results for the measured output costs 
under the fixed parameter conditions. As expected from the sensitivity results presented in 
Section 2.8, the uncertainty in the build time creates the greatest uncertainty for the cost 
reduction achieved in SMR production: the standard deviation in the first unit LCOE is 
approximately double that of the variation arising from standardisation and modularisation 
uncertainty. However, the uncertainty in learning has the greatest bearing on the long term 
economic competitiveness of an SMR programme. The coefficient of variation in TCC for the 
final unit due to learning uncertainty is approximately 3.12%, while that for the first unit due 
to standardisation is approximately 1.44%, and approximately 1.27% due to modularisation. 
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 𝝁𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍	𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕	𝑻𝑪𝑪 𝝈𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍	𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕	𝑻𝑪𝑪 𝝁𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍	𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕	𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑬 𝝈𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍	𝒖𝒏𝒊𝒕	𝑳𝑪𝑶𝑬 
Scaling 5,181 455 95 5 
Standardisation  5,046 115 94 1 
Modularisation 5,046 44 94 1 
Build Time - - 94 2 
Learning 5,121 160 95 2 
Table 37: Final unit cost uncertainty statistics 
Final unit TCC ($/kW) 5,046 
Final unit LCOE ($/MWh) 94 
Parity unit 5 
Table 38: Deterministic results for fixed parameters 
While the uncertainties in the individual cost reduction measures are considered 
separately in this analysis, it is crucial to recognise that the performance of these measures is 
coupled. The extent of standardisation will limit the extent of modularisation, as it is not 
economical to design a modularisation scheme for the custom, site-specific elements of a plant. 
Moreover, the reduction in the construction critical path length, and hence build time, is driven 
by the extent of modularisation.  
Finally, the learning cost reduction achievable is limited by the cost distribution 
between high and low learning environments, which is determined again by modularisation. 
For this reason, it is not appropriate to aggregate the uncertainties of these four measures; 
however detailed consideration of the combined effect of such correlated uncertainties in 
nuclear plant construction costs is provided by Maronati (2018). Given the relatively small 
resultant uncertainties from the individual input variations, the combined uncertainty would 
also be expected to be small. 
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8. Discussion & Conclusions 
In seeking to determine how supply chain configuration will affect the economics of 
small modular reactors, this research has taken the following approach: 
 
1. Develop a cost model employing defendable cost data and methods, that 
incorporates supply chain configuration parameters; 
2. Establish credible supply chain configurations for a SMR programme by 
combining supply chain design theory and real-world nuclear sector constraints; 
3. Evaluate the economic performance of the configurations using the model, to 
identify the crucial supply chain design decisions; 
4. Investigate the influence of supply chain constraints, such as market access, 
localisation, and programme set up costs. 
 
The cost model presented and demonstrated in Section 2 relies on the capital cost data 
provided by the US DOE’s EEDB, which provides a detailed breakdown by component and 
cost category. This structure enables the key cost estimating methods employed in the model: 
power scaling, standardisation, modularisation, schedule reduction, and production learning. It 
is in this final element where supply chain configuration has a significant bearing: this model 
uses both supplier relationship types and individual component production rate and volumes to 
calculate overall learning cost reduction, as detailed in Section 3. In this way, the model charts 
a middle course between the common top-down, industry level application of the experience 
curve (International Energy Agency, 2000), and a bottom-up aggregation of direct labour 
learning (Chen, et al., 2013). The demonstration results from the model show that the 
combination of standardisation and modularisation across the whole plant can offset the cost 
increases from economies of scale for smaller plants, such that a first-of-a-series SMR can be 
competitive with a conventional large reactor on specific total capital costs. Furthermore 
production learning can further reduce SMR costs. 
The findings from the single programme analysis in Section 4 make a compelling case 
for changing the nuclear construction paradigm. Production volume and production rate are 
both important for creating the opportunity for the underlying innovation that enables learning 
cost reduction. An SMR size of 250 MW is best placed to balance economies of scale with the 
learning benefits that come from volume production. 
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The savings from learning could be at risk of getting captured in the supply chain. 
Traditional transactional relationships, based on single project models, will not deliver the 
necessary cost improvements on factory components to SMR vendors. Instead, commitment 
and collaboration are essential to sharing the risk and rewards of an ambitious, long-term 
programme. SMR vendors should seek to establish strategic partnerships with their key 
suppliers, in the same manner as Boeing has in the aerospace sector (Tang & Zimmerman, 
2009). Without such partnerships market-based reactor vendors, even those with some in-house 
manufacturing capability, will struggle to compete against other fully-integrated organisations.  
The global analysis in Section 5 indicates that the demand exists for several large SMR 
programmes, if costs can be brought down to compete with conventional large reactors. 
Moreover this demand is not in one single global market. With the strength of their indigenous 
nuclear industries, the US, China and Russia will be closed markets to each other and other 
foreign vendors. Each of these countries has sufficient demand to support a domestic SMR 
programme. If segmented by individual country, demand in the rest of the world could not 
support further SMR programmes. However if grouped into export markets for the 3 
aforementioned programmes, this demand would add substantial production volume. This 
would be dependent upon significant harmonisation of global technical standards and 
regulation, such that the necessary design standardisation can be realised  and market access 
enabled. If this can be achieved, SMRs could be produced in enough volume to bring costs 
down to a globally competitive LCOE of $90/MWh, equating to a TCC of $6,280/kW for a 
250 MW SMR.   
With lower labour costs, an integrated vendor, and access to cheap government 
financing, a Chinese programme would likely be much more competitive than their US 
counterpart. However, the realisation of export opportunities will not be driven solely by cost: 
localisation is often a business-winning tactic, both for nuclear and other sectors such as 
aerospace. Some countries may require a degree of local manufacturing as part of their plant 
orders, in order to realise direct economic benefit from their investment. While the analysis 
suggests that labour rate variations can make up for the loss of learning in module production, 
it must be reiterated that factory component supply must continue to be consolidated in order 
to maintain learning benefits. Indeed, this presents a motivation for establishing international 
supply partners even at the outset of a purely domestic programme, enabling future market 
access; this can arguably be observed in the partnerships being established by the likes of 
NuScale (Bailey, 2019). Alternatively, countries with little or no nuclear experience may prefer 
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the opposite: delivery of the complete power plant package with no local content as often done 
for other high technology products such as civil aircraft. In such cases, countries would prefer 
the greater project certainty, shorter build periods and lower costs associated with 
standardisation, rather than opting for higher local content covering the simpler construction 
scope of work. 
Finally, the analysis is Section 6 further emphasises the need for a large volume 
programme of at least 10 GWe. With development costs likely to reach close to $4bn, vendors 
must be assured of sufficient sales over which to amortise these costs and recover their upfront 
investment. Moreover, these costs highlight the importance of early government involvement. 
While in certain markets governments are wary of financial involvement in specific nuclear 
plant projects, their support of the early development efforts could make the difference in 
reducing the risk of embarking on an SMR production programme. With the case having been 
made that a sufficient programme size can deliver cost competitive SMRs without state 
subsidy, governments may be more willing to take a stake in development projects in order to 
reap the economic benefits of such a programme. 
In summary the following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis presented in this 
study: 
 
1. While standardisation and modularisation can deliver first-of-a-series unit 
SMRs with lower capital costs than the equivalent large reactors, production 
learning is required to achieve further progressive reduction in LCOE, and thus 
make SMRs economically competitive. 
2. Learning is dependent on both production volume and rate, necessitating a 
significant multi-plant programme of at least 10 GWe committed upfront. The 
optimum reactor unit size appears to be in the region of 250 MW, though the 
specific value is to an extent dependant on the cost of finance. 
3. Long-term relationships with strategic suppliers will be critical, as factory made 
components have the dominant potential for learning cost reduction; 
collaborative partnerships must be pursued rather than conventional 
transactional relationships. 
4. While conservative estimates of aggregate global demand could support 
multiple vendors to deliver cost competitive SMRs, geopolitics and variations 
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in national markets will segment demand; nearly half of global demand will be 
closed to foreign competition.  
5. Progress is required in harmonising international technical standards and safety 
regulation to make the standard design and product-like concept proposed here 
economically effective. 
6. While modularisation moves significant amounts of on-site labour into more 
productive off-site labour, variations in global labour costs still have a 
discernible effect on SMR costs.  
7. Localisation of module manufacturing, to secure market access or overcome 
logistical constraints, can be justified for a sufficiently large market if design 
standardisation and build performance is maintained; volume for learning is 
much less important than the cost and time productivity benefits.  
8. Localisation of component supply is much harder to justify, as both 
concentrated production volumes and long term supplier relationships are 
required for learning.  
9. While the approximate $3.8bn up-front costs to establish an SMR programme 
will not significantly alter the economic competitiveness of individual SMR 
units, they reinforce the need for government support and a large committed 
market. Moreover, the risk involved in such an investment will likely deter 
private actors without some form of initial government financial support.    
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9. Appendix A: Modularisation Percentages 
Table 39 presents the modularisation percentages applied to the EEDB direct cost 
accounts for different reactor sizes. They were adopted as outputs from detailed work done by 
(Lloyd, 2019). 
 
  100 MW 250 MW 500 MW 1,144MW 
  Cost-Weighted Average 
Account 
Number 
Account Name 80.37% 76.03% 56.82% 30.30% 
211 Yardwork 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
212 Reactor Containment Bldg 0.81 0.72 0.54 0.19 
213 Turbine Room + Heater Bay 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.22 
214 Security Building 0.81 0.72 0.54 0.19 
215 Prim Aux Bldg + Tunnels 0.89 0.78 0.50 0.19 
216 Waste Process Building 0.89 0.78 0.50 0.19 
217 Fuel Storage Bldg 0.81 0.72 0.54 0.19 
218a Control Rm/D-G Building 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.32 
218b Adminstration + Service Bldg 0.81 0.72 0.54 0.19 
218d Fire Pump House inc Fndtns 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
218e Emergency Feed Pump Bldg 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
218f Manway Tunnels 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
218g Elec. Tunnels 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
218h Non-Essen. Swgr Bldg 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
218j Mn Steam + FW Pipe Enc. 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
218k Pipe Tunnels 0.81 0.72 0.54 0.19 
218l Technical Support Centre 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
218p Contain EQ Hatch Msle Shld 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
218s Waste Water Treatment 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
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  100 MW 250 MW 500 MW 1,144MW 
  Cost-Weighted Average 
Account 
Number 
Account Name 80.37% 76.03% 56.82% 30.30% 
218t Ultimate Heat Sink Struct 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
218v Contr Rm Emg Air Intk Str 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
220a Nuclear Steam Supply (NSSS) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
220b NSSS Options 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
221 Reactor Equipment 0.90 0.90 0.42 0.42 
222 Main Heat Xfer Xport Sys 0.90 0.90 0.42 0.42 
223 Safeguards System 0.90 0.90 0.42 0.42 
224 Radwaste Processing 0.90 0.90 0.42 0.42 
225 Fuel Handling + Storage 0.90 0.66 0.66 0.67 
226 Other Reactor Plant Equip 0.90 0.90 0.42 0.42 
227 Rx Instrumentation + Control 0.90 0.90 0.42 0.42 
228 Reactor Plant Misc Items 0.90 0.90 0.42 0.42 
231 Turbine Generator 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.52 
233 Condensing Systems 0.74 0.71 0.65 0.14 
234 Feed Heating System 0.74 0.71 0.65 0.14 
235 Other Turbine Plant Equip 0.74 0.71 0.65 0.14 
236 Instrumentation + Control 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.52 
237 Turbine Plant Misc Items 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.20 
241 Switchgear 0.85 0.80 0.72 0.54 
242 Station Service Equipment 0.85 0.80 0.72 0.54 
243 Switchboards 0.85 0.80 0.72 0.54 
244 Protective Equipment 0.85 0.80 0.72 0.54 
245 Elec. Struc + Wiring Contnr 0.85 0.80 0.72 0.54 
246 Power & Control Wiring 0.85 0.80 0.72 0.54 
251 Transportation & Lift Eqpt 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
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  100 MW 250 MW 500 MW 1,144MW 
  Cost-Weighted Average 
Account 
Number 
Account Name 80.37% 76.03% 56.82% 30.30% 
252 Air, Water + Steam Service Sy 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
253 Communications Equipment 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
254 Furnishings + Fixtures 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
255 Wastewater Treatment Equip 0.79 0.71 0.53 0.19 
261 Structures 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.14 
262 Mechanical Equipment 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.59 
Table 39: Modularisation percentages applied to each direct cost account 
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10. Appendix B: EEDB Accounts Four Box Scores 
Table 40 contains the individual scores for each EEDB four digit direct cost account. 
The scores were determined by the method described in Section 4.1.3. Yellow shaded scores 
are based on information from the Nuclear Energy Agency (2015); orange shaded scores are 
based on related accounts from the ANS Buyers Guide (American Nuclear Society, 2016); grey 
shaded accounts follow the assumed trend discussed in Section 4.1.3.  
 
Account  Account Name Account Account Name 
Quality 
Requirements 
& Risk 
Number of  
Suppliers 
Based on related 
account 
211 Yardwork 
211.1 General Yardwork Low High - 
211.4 Railroads Low High - 
211.7 
Structure 
Associated 
Yardwork 
High Low - 
212 Reactor Containment Bldg 
212.1 Building Structure High Low - 
212.2 Building Services High Low - 
213 Turbine Room + Heater Bay 
213.1 Building Structure Low High - 
213.2 Building Services Low High - 
214 Security Building 
214.1 Building Structure Medium Medium - 
214.2 Building Services Medium Medium - 
215 Prim Aux Bldg + Tunnels 
215.1 Building Structure Low High - 
215.2 Building Services Low High - 
216 Waste Process Building 
216.1 Building Structure Low High - 
216.2 Building Services Low High - 
217 Fuel Storage Bldg 
217.1 Building Structure Medium Medium - 
217.2 Building Services Medium Medium - 
218a Control Rm/D-G Building 
218A.1 Building Structure Medium Medium - 
218A.2 Building Services Medium Medium - 
218b Adminstration + Service Bldg 
218B.1 Building Structure Low High - 
218B.2 Building Services Low High - 
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Account  Account Name Account Account Name 
Quality 
Requirements 
& Risk 
Number of  
Suppliers 
Based on related 
account 
218d Fire Pump House inc Fndtns 
218D.1 Building Structure Medium Medium - 
218D.2 Building Services Medium Medium - 
218e Emergency Feed Pump Bldg 
218E.1 Building Structure Medium Medium - 
218E.2 Building Services Medium Medium - 
218f Manway Tunnels 
218F.1 Building Structure Low High - 
218F.2 Building Services Low High - 
218g Elec. Tunnels 
218G.1 Building Structure Low High - 
218G.2 Building Services Low High - 
218h Non-Essen. Swgr Bldg 
218H.1 Building Structure Low High - 
218H.2 Building Services Low High - 
218j Mn Steam + FW Pipe Enc. 
218J.1 Building Structure Medium Medium - 
218J.2 Building Services Medium Medium - 
218k Pipe Tunnels 
218K.1 Building Structure Low High - 
218K.2 Building Services Low High - 
218l Technical Support Centre 
218L.1 Building Structure Medium Medium - 
218L.2 Building Services Medium Medium - 
218p Contain EQ Hatch Msle Shld 218P.1 Shield Structure High Low - 
218s Waste Water Treatment 
218S.11 Building Structure Low High - 
218S.12 Building Services Low High - 
218S.2 Waste Water Holding Basins Low High - 
218t Ultimate Heat Sink Struct 
218T.1 Building Structure Low High - 
218T.2 Building Services Low High - 
218v Contr Rm Emg Air Intk Str 
218V.1 Building Structure Medium Medium - 
218V.2 Building Services Medium Medium - 
220a Nuclear Steam Supply (NSSS) 220A.1 
Quoted NSSS 
Price High Low - 
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Account  Account Name Account Account Name 
Quality 
Requirements 
& Risk 
Number of  
Suppliers 
Based on related 
account 
220A.2 Distributed NSSS Cost High Low - 
220b NSSS Options     High Low - 
221 Reactor Equipment 
221.1 Reactor Vessel + Accessory High Low - 
221.2 Reactor Control Devices High Low - 
222 Main Heat Xfer Xport Sys 
222.11 Fluid Circulation Drive System High Low - 
222.12 Reactor Coolant Piping System High Low - 
222.13 Steam Generator Equipment High Low - 
222.14 Pressurizing System High Medium - 
223 Safeguards System 
223.1 Residual Heat Removal System High Low - 
223.3 Safety Injection System High Low - 
223.4 Containment Spray System High Low - 
223.5 Combustible Gas Control System High Low - 
224 Radwaste Processing 
224.1 Liquid Waste System Low Medium - 
224.2 Radioactive Gas Waste Processing High Medium - 
224.3 Solid Waste System Low Medium - 
225 Fuel Handling + Storage 
225.1 
Fuel Handling 
Tools + 
Equipment 
High Low - 
225.3 Service Platforms High Low - 
225.4 Fuel Storage, 
Cleaning, + 
Low High - 
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Account  Account Name Account Account Name 
Quality 
Requirements 
& Risk 
Number of  
Suppliers 
Based on related 
account 
Inspection 
Equipment 
226 Other Reactor Plant Equip 
226.1 Inert Gas System Low High - 
226.3 Reactor Makeup Water System Low High - 
226.4 Coolant Treatment & Recycle Low High - 
226.6 Fluid Leak Detection System High Medium - 
226.7 Auxillary Cooling System High Low - 
226.8 Maintenance Equipment Low High - 
226.9 Sampling Equipment Low High - 
227 Rx Instrumentation + Control 
227.1 Benchboard, Panels + Racks High High - 
227.2 Process Computer High Medium - 
227.3 Monitoring Systems High High - 
227.4 Plant Control Systems High High - 
227.5 Reactor Plant I+C Tubing + Fitting High High - 
227.9 TMI Instrumentation High Low - 
228 Reactor Plant Misc Items 
228.1 Field Painting Low High - 
228.2 Qualification of Welders High Low - 
228.4 Reactor Plant Insulation High Low 
Insulation, 
radiation resistant 
231 Turbine Generator 
231.1 Turbine Generator + Accessory Medium Medium - 
231.2 Foundations Low Medium - 
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Account  Account Name Account Account Name 
Quality 
Requirements 
& Risk 
Number of  
Suppliers 
Based on related 
account 
231.4 Lubricating Oil System Low High - 
231.5 Gas System Low High - 
231.6 
Moisture 
Separator/Reheater 
Drain System 
Low Low - 
233 Condensing Systems 
233.1 Condenser Equipment Low Medium - 
233.2 Condensate System Low Low - 
233.3 Gas Removal System Low High - 
233.4 Turbine Bypass System Low Low - 
233.5 Condensate Polishing Low Medium - 
234 Feed Heating System 
234.1 Feedwater Heaters Low Medium - 
234.2 Feedwater System Low Low Feedwater regulators 
234.3 Extraction Steam System Low High - 
234.4 FWH Vent + Drain System Low Medium Feedwater heaters 
235 Other Turbine Plant Equip 
235.1 Main Vapor Piping System High High Pipe categories 
235.2 Turbine Auxiliaries Low High - 
235.3 
Turbine Closed 
CLG Water 
System 
Low High - 
235.4 
Demineralised 
Water Makeup 
System 
Low Medium 
DM Water 
Treatment 
Equipment & 
supplies 
235.5 Chemical Treatment System Low High - 
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Account  Account Name Account Account Name 
Quality 
Requirements 
& Risk 
Number of  
Suppliers 
Based on related 
account 
235.6 Neutralization System Low High - 
236 Instrumentation + Control 
236.1 Process IC Equipment Low High 
Electronic 
Instrumentation & 
supplies 
236.2 Process Computer Low High 
Electronic 
Instrumentation & 
supplies 
236.3 Turbine Plant I+C Tubing Low High Tubing 
237 Turbine Plant Misc Items 
237.1 Field Painting Low High - 
237.2 Qualification of Welders High Low - 
237.3 Turbine Plant Insulation Low Medium Insulation, thermal 
241 Switchgear 
241.1 
General 
Equipment 
Switchgear 
Low Low - 
241.2 Station Service Switchgear Low Low 
Electrical Distr. & 
Control 
242 Station Service Equipment 
242.1 
Station Service & 
Startup 
Transformer 
Low Low - 
242.2 Unit Substations Low Low Electrical Distr. & Control 
242.3 Auxilary Power Sources Low High Power supplies 
243 Switchboards 
243.1 Control Panels Low High 
Control 
equipment, power 
plant (non-reactor) 
243.2 Auxilary Power & Signal Boards Low High 
Control 
equipment, power 
plant (non-reactor) 
244 Protective Equipment 
244.1 General Station Ground System Low Low 
Electrical Distr. & 
Control 
244.2 Fire Detection + Suppession Low Low 
Alarm Systems - 
Fire; Fire 
Protection 
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Account  Account Name Account Account Name 
Quality 
Requirements 
& Risk 
Number of  
Suppliers 
Based on related 
account 
244.3 Lightning Protection Low High - 
244.4 Cathodic Protection Low High - 
244.5 Heat Tracing + Freeze Protection Low High - 
245 Elec. Struc + Wiring Contnr 
245.1 Underground Duct Runs Low Low Ducts 
245.2 Cable Tray Low Low - 
245.3 Conduit Low Low Ducts/Cable tray 
246 Power & Control Wiring 
246.1 Generator Circuits Wiring Low Medium Wire 
246.2 Station Service Power Wiring Low Medium cable, power 
246.3 Control Cable Low Medium - 
246.4 Instrument Wire Low High cable, instrumentation 
246.5 Containment Penetrations Low High - 
251 Transportation & Lift Eqpt 251.1 Cranes & Hoists Low Low 
mixture of crane & 
hoists types 
(limiting) 
252 Air, Water + Steam Service Sy 
252.1 Air Systems Low High - 
252.2 Water Systems High Low - 
252.3 Auxiliary Steam System High Low 
Steam generators, 
standy-by, 
auxiliary 
252.4 Plant Fuel Oil System High Low - 
253 Communications Equipment 
253.1 
Local 
Communications 
System 
Medium Low Communication system 
253.2 Signal System Medium Low 
Emergency 
warning systems 
(worker) 
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Account  Account Name Account Account Name 
Quality 
Requirements 
& Risk 
Number of  
Suppliers 
Based on related 
account 
254 Furnishings + Fixtures 
254.1 Safety Equipment Medium Medium - 
254.2 Chemical Lab Shop Low High - 
254.3 Office Equipment + Furnishings Low High - 
254.4 Change Room Equipment Low High - 
254.5 
Environment 
Monitoring 
Equipment 
Low High - 
254.6 Dining Facilities Low High - 
255 Wastewater Treatment Equip     Low Medium 
Water treatment 
equipment & 
supplies 
261 Structures 
261.1 Makeup Water Intake Low Medium 
Water Intake 
facilities 
261.2 Circulating Water Pump House Low Medium 
structural supports, 
component 
262 Mechanical Equipment 
261.3 
Makeup Water 
Pretreatment 
Building 
Low Medium Water Intake facilities 
262.1 Heat Rejection System High Low 
Heat sinks, 
ultimate; towers, 
cooling 
Table 40: EEDB accounts four box scores 
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11. Appendix C: Key Component Suppliers 
The component descriptions and supplier information shown in this appendix are taken 
from both the NEA (2015, pp. 148-153)  and Nuclear Energy International (2012, pp. 46-87). 
Table 41 shows the region key for supplier locations. 
 
Region Key 
  North America 
  Europe 
  Asia 
Table 41: Supplier Locations 
 Reactor Plant Equipment – Reactor Equipment: 
• Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) 
– ‘a thick-walled, high integrity, pressure vessel’, made up of ‘large and ultra-large 
forgings, which can only be manufactured in a few places around the world’;  
 
RPV Suppliers Country 
Ansaldo Italy 
AREVA France 
Doosan Korea 
IHI Japan 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Japan 
OMZ Russia 
Skoda Czech Republic 
Table 42: List of RPV Suppliers 
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• RPV internals 
– ‘high precision, high quality components’ which support the fuel within the core and 
provide shielding to reduce the amount of radiation leaving the core; usually produced 
by the RPV supplier; 
 Reactor Plant Equipment – Main Heat Transfer and Transport 
System: 
• Steam generator 
– a pressure vessel containing ‘heat exchange tubes welded into a thick tube plate, along 
with steam dryers and separators’; only a small number of suppliers are capable of their 
manufacture and assembly; 
 
SG Suppliers Country 
AREVA France 
AtomEnergoMash Russia 
Babcock & Wilcox USA 
Doosan Korea 
ENSA Spain 
Larsen and Toubro India 
Mangiarotti Italy 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Japan 
Shanghai Boiler Works China 
Table 43: List of Steam Generator Suppliers 
• Pressuriser 
– a pressure vessel containing both heating and water spray systems; vessel is smaller 
than both RPV and steam generator, so there are a greater number of potential suppliers; 
internals can be produced by many separate suppliers; 
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• Valves and pumps 
– the most safety critical pumps and valves are provided by specialists; lower grade 
components can come from many suppliers; 
 
Pump Suppliers Country 
AtomEnergoMash Russia 
AREVA JSPM France 
Curtiss-Wright Flow Control USA 
EBARA Japan 
Flowserve USA 
Hayward Tyler USA 
HMS Pumps Russia 
KSB AG Germany 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Japan 
Shanghai Electric China 
SPX Flow Technology USA 
Teikoku Electric Manufacturing Japan 
Weir Group UK 
Table 44: List of Pump Suppliers 
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Valve Suppliers Country 
AtomEnergoMash Russia 
AUMA Germany 
Armatury Group Czech Republic 
Dresser USA 
Emerson Process Management USA 
Flowserve Corp. USA 
KSB AG Germany 
Larsen & Toubro India 
Oka Ltd Japan 
Okano Valve Manufacturing Japan 
PK Valve Korea 
Samshin Ltd Korea 
SPX Flow Technology USA 
Toa Valve Engineering Japan 
Toshiba Japan 
TyazhPromArmatura Russia 
Tyco Flow Technology USA 
Weir Group UK 
Westinghouse USA 
Velan Inc. Canada 
Table 45: List of Valve Suppliers 
• Pipework 
– primary loop pipework, being ‘thick-walled pipe made from forgings’, can only be 
manufactured by a few suppliers; usually done by a strategic partner of the reactor 
vendor; lower grade pipework can be provided by a greater number of suppliers; 
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 Turbine Generator Plant Equipment – Turbine/Generator Plants 
• Turbine and generator 
– for current reactor designs which have outputs of more than 1,000 MWe these are ‘very 
large by comparison to other thermal power plants’ and often use wet (or saturated) 
steam rather than superheated steam, therefore only a limited number of potential 
suppliers;  
 
TG Suppliers Country 
Alstom France 
Bharat Heavy Electricals India 
China First Heavy Industries China 
China Dongfang Electric Corp. China 
Doosan/Skoda Power Korea 
GE USA 
Hitachi Japan 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Japan 
OMZ Russia 
Siemens Germany 
Silmash Russia 
Toshiba Japan 
Table 46: List of Turbine & Generator Suppliers 
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 Electrical Equipment and I&C Plant Equipment 
• High voltage transformers and switchgear 
– often provided by the T&G vendor; 
• Back-up power supplies 
– can be provided by a broad set of suppliers; 
• Control and instrumentation 
• Power plant control 
– based on a standard I&C platform, provided by specialist suppliers; 
• Ancillary C&I 
– provided by specialist suppliers; 
• Reactor sensors 
– provided by specialist suppliers; 
• Reactor protection system 
– these systems are usually provided by the reactor vendor or a strategic partner, 
due to the need of familiarity with the design: 
C&I Suppliers Country 
AREVA France 
AtomEnergoMash Russia 
Doosan Korea 
GE Hitachi USA/Japan 
Invensys UK 
Lockheed Martin USA 
Mitsubishi Electric Corp. Japan 
Rolls-Royce UK 
Skoda JS Czech Republic 
Toshiba Japan 
Westinghouse USA 
Table 47: List of Control & Instrumentation Suppliers 
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• Fuel handling equipment 
Fuel Handling Equipment Suppliers Country 
Andritz AG Austria 
NES UK 
Babcock International UK 
Babcock Noell GmbH Germany 
China Advanced Technologies China 
Ederer Nuclear Cranes Division USA 
Newburgh Engineering Co Ltd UK 
PaR Nuclear Inc USA 
Precision Components Corp USA 
Preferred Engineering USA 
Reel SA France 
Table 48: List of Fuel Handling Equipment Suppliers 
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• Fuel storage racks 
Fuel Storage Racks Suppliers Country 
Equipos Nucleares SA Spain 
Siempelkamp Nuclear Services, Inc USA 
Siempelkamp Nuclear Technology, Inc USA 
Siempelkamp Nuclear Technology UK Ltd UK 
Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik GmbH Germany 
Skoda JS Czech Republic 
CCI AG Switzerland 
Holtec International USA 
Holtec Manufacturing Division USA 
Northeast Technology Corp USA 
Precision Components Corp USA 
Roberts Engineering Services Inc USA 
Transnuclear, Inc USA 
Table 49: List of Fuel Storage Rack Suppliers 
• Radioactive waste plant 
– specialist companies required for design of this system, but there are many firms that 
are capable of manufacturing it; 
• Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) 
– many suppliers available to provide both the nuclear and conventional HVAC systems. 
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